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[SENATE.]

27th CONGRESS,
2d Session.

MESSAGE
FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
TRANSMITTING,

In compliance, in part, with a resolution of the Senate, a report from the
Secretary of War respecting the defences of the country.

DECEMBER

13, 1841.

Read, and ordered to be printed.

To the Senate of the United States :
I transmit herewith a report from the War Department, in compliance with
so much of the resolution of the Senate, of March 3, 1841, respecting the
. military and naval defences of the country, as relates to the defences under
the superintendence of that Departinent.

JOHN TYLER.
WASHINGTON,

December 7, 1841.

DEPARTMENT OF

wAR,

December 6, 1841..
Sm: On the 3d of March, 1841, a r.esolution was adopted by the Se;ate,
reqµesting the President of the United States to cause to be laid' before theSenate at the commencement of the (then) next session of Congress, reports
upon the military and naval defences of the country, which were required to
imbody various information upon the subjects specified in the resolution.
Upon. entering on the discharge of the , duties of the -Department, , I found
that a report in compliance with the resolution, had been prepared by my'"
immediate .predecessor. Concun~ng, generally, in the yiews it contains, and
:finding nothing upon which I am prepared at this time to express any different opinion, it has appeared to me equally j~st and respectful to the gentleman, who has obviously devoted much' tinie and consideration to the subject,
to submit the report thus prepared as that of the Department. A copy of the
• record of it, in this offiGe, is therefore transmitted herewith; as the answer to
so much of the resolution of the Senate as relates to the military defences of
the country.
·
Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

JOHN C. SPENCER. ·
To the

PRESIDENT

Thomas Allen, print.

of the United States.
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DEPARTMENT OF WAR, August 30, 1841.
Sm: I have the honor to submit the accompanying reports from the officers at the head of the corps of military engineers, aind the Ordnance De-

,.

partment, respectively, on the several points connected with the public defence,
embraced in the resolution of the Senate of the 3d day of March last, and
which are, at the same time, within the, superintendence of this. Department.
The views and plans presented in these papers, are fully sustained and
approved by the report of a board composed of the most distinguished and
able officers in the service, made under the direction of this Department, and
in compliance with a resolution of the Senate on the 9th day of May, 1840.
The well-considered opinions of experienced and scientific gentlemen, upon
subjects within the line of a profession which, it is well known, that no high
degree of skill or competency can be attained without a particular course of
study and observation, are entitled to gi:eat weight; and none of inferior
knowledge of the subject, and who desires the national safety and honor,
will venture to oppose them without diffidence.
By reference to the report which I had the honor to submit at the commencement of the present session of Congress, it will be perceived that the
approval and recommendation of the plan and estimates for the military defences of the country, then presented by the Chief Engineer, and which do
not vary materially from those now brought forward by the same officer, were
limited to those works which were supposed to be indispensable to what might
})e considered a good state of defensive preparations for war, and which might
be completed in a reasonable time. To secure this limited object, it was
estimated that an expenditme of $9,&73,547 would be required for the construction and repair of fortifications on the Atlantic and Gulf coast, and
$2,493,000 for their appropriate armament. The expenditure of the further
sum of $2,112,500 for the defence of the Southern: and $895,000 for the
Western frontiers, ought to have been included, which would have made the
whole expenditure for the construction and repairs of fortifications, recommended by the Department, $13,751,047. In the opinion of the Chief Engineer, as will appear from his report, a proper system of defence for the Atlantic_and Gulf coast-a system which will give due security to all the important and ~xposed points-will require a still further expenditure of $19,521,824 for the construction of an additional class of works, and $3,735,330
for their armament, making an aggregate of expenditure for this class, amounting to $23,257,154.
It appears from the report of the 9th of May, 1840, before referred to, that
there has been expended in the construction and repairs of works already completed: or under construction, and constituting part of the system recommendeu by the Chief Engineer, the sum of $ 13,323,828. If, therefore, the
entire system of land defences recommended in the report of the Chief En~neer, for the pr~tection of a frontier, inland and maritime, of upward of
eight thousand miles extent, should be adopted and carried out, the expenditme upon the several works will have been $45,449,699, and for the armament $6,228,370, making a grand total of $51,677,929. This appears to be
a large sum to be expended upon fo1tifications; and the country is not prepared to ap:pr~ve a ~st~m of public defence upon so extended and costly a
~ale; y~t, it 1s but Just.Ice to the patriotic and intelligent officers who urge
its adoption, to rema_r~, that the aggregate expenditure proposed by them,
exceeds, by a few millions only, the public revenue for the single year of

3
1836 nor do·es it exceed double the amount o{ the· an~ual ,revenue from lli~
,usual sources_, when the country is in a condition of _ordinary prosp~r!ty. A
far 'greater amount has been expended upon many smgle harbors, c1t1es, ~n,d
,other points of militar~ i1!1portance in the old -~orld. T~e defence~ of th_e
city of Q,uebec, the pnh·c1pal fortress of the Bnt1sh P?s~ess10ns on. t~iS contr1nent it is believed cannot have cost less than ten m1lhons; .and 1t 1s stated
upo~ respectable au'thority that the Cabanas, the principal fort erected for the
protection of the harbor and city of Havana, in Cuba, cost the _Governme~t
of Spain sixty millions of dollars! It is also proper to state, that the cost _of
the entire system of permanent and fixed, defences presented by the (:h1ef
Engineer, is decidedly more moderate than that of other plans of nat10n~l
-d~fence, which can claim the _s~ppor_t of names of ~istin_ction i~ the ~ilitary
history of the country. A d1stmgmshed officer, high m command m tiie
_.army, has for y-ears earnestly pressed upon the attention of Congress and the
public, a system of defence by railroads and floating batteries, naving undoubtedly much to recommend it; yet, if adopted and executed in all its
·parts, would require an expenditure much greater than the system presented
·in the accompanying report. ·
Nevertheless, I do not consider it wise or expedient, so far in advance of
, the period when a Js1-rge portion of the new works projected andrecomm end~ ~d can be construcfed, to assume that they will continue to be necessary and
proper. That will depend greatly upon the improvements now being made
in the application of existing inventions to 'war purposes, and of others tnat
may be rationally expected to be made in the meantime. 'A period of ten
years has become sufficient, in point of duration, to mark an epoch in the
onward progress of modem invention and improvement. Even five years
may modify, materially, plans of defencB now reputed wisest and most in;dispensable. But these anticipations of the future should not deter those
who·are now charged with the high trust of providing for the national we1-fare and security, from the adoption and vigorous execution of the system of
,- defence deemed most effective for the present, at least so far as to cover the
-approaches to all our most important commercial and naval depots. 'I'o tnjs
extent I insisted, in a former report from this Department, upon the necessifr
of conforming to the recommendations of the Chief Engineer. I still aahere to the opinion then expressed on this point, leaving it exclusively to
those who shall have charge of the subject hereafter; and when the question
-shall properly arise, to~ecide whether the system shall be completed, by die
construction of all the works enumerated in the accompanying report, or
whether some other and better plan of national defence may not, with advantage, be substituted for it.
But, from causes not necessary to be explained, fortifications and extravagance have, in popular estimation, become synonymous terms, and an impres~ion prevails with many that such works, even upon the,limited scale
recommended by this Department, are comparatively useless; hence the
country is prone to embrace any new theory which holds out tlie promise
•of greater economy with any degree of efficie:ncy. , 'Since the :recent ~~d
successful experiments in the navigation of the Atlantic by steam, ·and the
consequent changes anticipated in maritime warfare, it is not an uncommon impression that fortifications, and all other land defenc~s, may be dispensed with altogether; and that the navy, inw'roved and strengthened b-y
war-steamers and floating batteries, may be safely and exclusively relied
upon for the defence of our extensive seacoast. Another error, not less to
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be regretted, has obtained some hold upon the public mind since the exten~ion of steam navigation, already adverted to, and the improvements lately
.~uggested in the means of defending the seaboard. It is, that the defence·
of our numerous inlets, harbors, and naval depots will, by these improvements, be rendered not only more certain and easy, but less expensive than
heretofore, and, therefore, of diminished importance in every point of view.
The very reverse of these conclusions, it may be . justly apprehended, will
be realized in the experience of the future. The increased facilities which
the late extension of steam navigation will give to any great maritime
Power, holding possession of one or more naval depots on this·side of the
. Atlantic, in concentrating a large naval or military force upon any one of
the numerous assailable points upon our extensive seacoast-the celerity
of movement, and the greater certainty and precision which will be thereby
.secured in the execution of all the details of an attack, enabling an enemy
to make it, in every instance, a surprise-will probably create .a necessity
for increasing our defences in some form, at an expense far exceeding anything heretofore deemed important or necessary to reasonable security. To ·
provide adequate defences for every exposed point, may become so great a
tax upon the resources of the country that it may come to be regarded a
less evil to leave the largest portion of our coast at the mercy of an enemy,
and to apply our whole disposable means to bring to bear upon it. But
the prospect of successful defence, by the navy alone, vanishes altogether
when we reflect that it is only in infancy, and that for a long time it must
be inferior to the naval armaments of several of the Powers of Europe.
Whether the United States will be able, at any time, to contend with them
upon the ocean, it is obvious will depend upon the successful development of
our naval resources after the commencement of a war; but how could this
development take place ·in the face of a much more powerful enemy, if our
depots and navy-yards are suffered to remain without adequate protection
by fortifications, and there are no harbors in which our ships of war may
take refuge, and remain in safety when pursued by superior squadrons?
It would be fatal to the national honor to neglect to fortify sufficiently and
amply those passes, by land and water, by which an enemy could approach
:the depositories of our naval supplies, and also the principal harbors of
.easy access to our own vessels.
The necessary quality of buoyancy in war-steamers and floating batteries r~quires that they should be constituted mainly of wood; and whether
of wood or iron, their destructibility, by the usual missiles employed in war,
will be neither greater nor less than that of the war-steamers and floating batteries, with which an enemy may attack them . . It is clear, then, that
nothing will be gained by their exclusive employment, in this point o(
view. It is equally clear that if an enemy is able to concentrate a much
· superior force upon any one of our great harbors and naval depots than is
provided for its defence, he must, wit~out some extraordinary casualty, be
.successful. To guard, therefore, agamst the capture or destruction of all
our opulent cities and great naval depots upon the seaboard, the Government must provide a greater number of war-steamers and :floating batteries,
for tlte defence of each of tltem, than any foreign nation will probably be
al;>le to assemble. upon our coast, and thus have it in his power, by uniting
- his whole force m nn attack upon one point at a time to lay under contriuti n or dcstr y the whol .
'
But s pposc each f o_ur great harbors or depots should be thus defended,
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and that all the channels or passes by water could be' so guarded and blocked
up by :floating batteries, or with the advantages of position to set at defiance
any naval force which could be brought to the attack, without fortifications
to guard the passes or avenues over which an enemy could reach his objeot by land, what would prevent him from disembarking a su:ffici~nt land force
at some other, but not distant point, upon the coast and effecting all his purposes of spoliation and destruction? It is manifest that something more wilt
be wanting than war-steamers and floating batteries to give even tolerable
security to our cities and naval depots. If fortifications are to be dispensed
with, it is clear, that to affor'd them adequate protection and security against'
the sudden assaults of an enemy approaching by sea, wilL require, not only
such a preparation of war-steamers and floating batteries as already described,.
but a stationary land force sufficient in numbers and discipline to resist any
number of veteran troops the ene·m y might have it in his power to employ
as an auxiliary force in hi~ enterprises upon our shores.
Supp9sing the defences of a harbor, by fortifications, to be complete, and
the attacking ships or war-steamers of an enemy shall have succeeding in
passing the outer channels leading to it, without material damage from the
forts designed to guard them ; or if they shall have taken advantage of the
darkness of the night, and passed them unobserved, they will have gained
but little by that success. They will be exposed at every point within, to
·the fire of one or more forts or land-batteries. They will be able to find no
anchorage or resting-place where they will not be liable to be disabled, burnt,
or blown up, by the shells and hot shot discharged under protection of walls,
impenetrable to the shot of an ~nemy, except at the gun ports. Not so,
however, when floating defences are exclusively relied upon. They will
have no advantage in the fight over the attacking force--they will be equally
exposed and combustible; and when once overcome, all resistance ceases,
and the success of the enemy will be complete.
On the question of the relative efficiency and cheapness of defences by fortifications or fixed batteries and by ships of wa::.- and :(loating batteries, several
points deserve conside1'.ation.
.
The comparative efficiency of guns in forts and on board ships orwar or
floating batteries when brought into action as antagonist forces, has been variously estimated, but the results of experience seem to jµstify the opinion,
that one gun in a fort, advantageously situated, is equal to ten on ·board an
attacking squadron of ships of war. The relative expense of guns in forts
and on board ships of war or floating batteries is not so great, but still strikingly disproportionate. The most favorable estimate will show, that guns·
afloat will cost, upon an average, a third more than the cost of guns in forts.
W ell-constmcted forts, bearing any µumber of guns, may be erected at less
than half the amount required to build good steam-batteries bearing the same
number of guns. The steamships, now on the stocks at New York and
Philadelphia, of 1,700 tons burden, and designed to carry only eight guM
each, it is estimated, will cost $600,000 each. A floating batt~ry of the,
largest class, contemplated by a distinguished advocate for that mode of harbor defence, carrying two hundred guns, with its tow-boats, it is estimated,
cannot cost less than $1,400,000, and th€ smallest, parrying one hundred
and twenty guns, not less than $700,000. A ship of the line, carrying
eighty g_uns, it is estimated, will cost, without her armament, $500,000.. Fort
A~ams 1s constructed for four hundred and fifty-eight guns; when fimshed,
will have cost $1,400,000. Forts are built of solid, and, for the most part.
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cf imperishable materials. By proper care and a small annual expenditure for
l'fil)airs, they will last and be available for centuries : while the cost of the
re-pairs that ships of war and floating batteries will require, in eyery twelve or ·
:fit:teen years, will equal the cost of the original construction. In other words,
:il)- respect to the expense, vessels of war and floating batteries will require to
be reconstructed every twelve or fifteen years. The injury done to fortification~ in the most serious engagements can usually be repaired in a few days,
or, at most, in a few weeks, while the damages to ships of war and floating batteries, i:m a similar engagement, would require extensive repairs in
every instance, and often renders them unworthy of repair.
Upon these data, a satisfactory ·estimate may be made of the relative expense of the two. modes of defending our principal harbors and naval depots.
In presenting these views, I would not be understood, by any means, as:disparaging the value and efficiency of war-steamers and floating batteries,.
when employed as an auxiliary force in any system of coast or harbor defence that may be adopted. Nor is any idea entertained that they ought, or:
can, be altogether dispensed with.
All which is respectfully submitted.

To the

JOHN BELL.
PRESIDENT.

(

I
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Report ef,the Chief Engineer in answer to the resolutions of the Senate
of March 3, 1841, respecting the defences ef.the co_,untry.
ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, Washington, July 1, 1841'
·S m ,: l ' have the honor to submit the following remark~, in compliance
wi!h your .directions, touching a series of resolutions of the Senate of the 3d
of March last, requiring information in relation to various subjects connected-'
w<ith the ,national defences, and calling -for a report on such portions of these
resolutions as belong to this department.
Most of the information required by the resolutions, in relation to the permanent defences, will be found in a report made by a board of officers to the
Secretary of War, 23d April, 1840 (see Senate document 451, 1st session,
26th Congress). This document may be further referred to as giving, in
detail, much information in relation to the system of national defence ; and
from it is, drawn the greater portion of what will be found imbodied in the
following report.
-

Northern frontier.
This frontier extends, as described- by the terms of the resolutions, from

Uaflrn Superior to Passamaquoddy bay, a distance of somewhat more than _
two thousand miles, binding all the way on the British American provinces.
Whether we regard the strongly-marked ·geographical features of this frontier, presenting, as it does, for the most part, a chain of great lakes or inland
seas, stretching along the border, the common property of two nations, and
affording facilities for an extensive commerce, almost, rivalling that of the
ocean itself; or, whether we look to the growing strength of ·our colonial
neighbors, fostered by the im~ense power and resources of the mother-counry, its vast importance cannot fail to i.mpress us with the neGessity of being
prepared, not only for defence along that line, but ~so to act offensively,
with decisive effect, in the event of our being involved in a national conflict.
From the peculiar character of this frontier, its defence must necessarily
partake somewhat of the sy~tem applicable to the seacoast; for, ahhough it
is denominated inland, in contradiction to the latter, it is, nevertheless, maritime in many of its features, and must be .treateq accordingly for p,urpo,ses of
defence.
So important is the mastery on the lakes, in any military operations in tµat
quarter, that it is scarcely to be doubted that, in the event of a war, ther,e
will be some naval preparations on both sides, and a struggle for the ascendency on those waters. ·whichever power shall acquire that, even temporarily,
will have the means of assailing his adversary with gre·at effect <\long the
shores of the lakes, in the abstmce of fortifications, by occupying the harbors,
destroying the towns (some of which are fast advancing to the rank of cities),
and controlling the commercial operations, of which those lakes constitute,.
the principal channel. These considerations render it highly expedient, indeed necessary, to fortify the larger harbors on the lakes, as well as the mo.re
imp~r~ant passes on the straits and rivers by which they are connected.
Without entering fully into the military details of the subject, which might
be ~eemed somewhat out of place here, regarding th~ object of the 'resolutions;
which seems to look rather to the expense involved, the department will p,roceed _to enuz:ner~te the works of defence deemed necessary on the northern
frontier, beg1?hrng a~ Lake Superior; merely glancing at the effects and advantages which are likely to result from the establishment of those works.
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I. Fbrt at Falls of St. Mary.-A fort here will control the eommunica..
tion between Lake Huron and Lake Superior, and, at least, prevent an enemy from availing itself of it for purposes of communication, and for the
transportation of supplies, if it does not secure those important advantages to
us; which it would do, unless counteracted by a work on the British side of
the line. In that event, almost certain to occur, it would be neutralized,
but would still serve to cover and protect our settlements along the St. Mary,
and form a rallying point for local defence in times of ala1m.
Estimated expense of fort, barracks, &c.
:.
-·
$75,000
2. Fort at Michilimackinac.-Although this position is somewhat interior, it is regarded of high importance from its geographical relations. A fort here, in- conjunction with floating batteries, may be made to command, effectually, the approach to Lake Michigan, and shut out an enemy who might
possess a naval ascendency on Lake Huron; thus protecting
the entire circumference of Lake Michigan from attacks to
which it would otherwise be exposed, even from a small
force, and securing it to ourselves, as a safe channel of communication with the rich and productiv~ States in the rear,
whose shores it washes.
Estimated expense -;:_
,
50,000
3. Fort at the foot of Lake Huron.-A work here will control the outlet of Lake Hmon, and interrupt the navigation
between that and Lake St. Clair and the river Detroit. It
will serve, also, to cover the settlements on that part of the
frontier, and form a rallying point for the neighboring militia
for local defence.
Estimated expense 50,000
4. Fort and barrack establishment at Detroit.-In the event
of war, Detroit would undoubtedly be a point of considerable concentration of troops, not merely for the defence of
that portion of the frontier, but for such offensive operations as might be deemed expedient in that quarter. It
·maybe reo-arded as the centre of the upper section of the
northern frontier, and has important relations, both geographical and military. Although true policy would, in
such a case, dictate that our chief efforts should be directed against the vital points of the enemy's possessions as
low down the line as practicable, still it might become
expedient, with a view to distract his attention and divide
his forces, to menace him above ; and this is one of the
points from which he might be assailed by minor expeditions, especially if he should relax his measures of defence,
in looking to his safety elsewhere.
Estimated expense of barracks for one regiment,
including site
- $150,000
Wells, inEstimated expense of fort at Sprino0
cluding site -.
_
100,000
5. Fielclrwork and barrack e tabli !iment at or near Buffalo.
::r'he wealth ~n~ commercia~ _imp?rtance of Buffalo, and
~ts clo e prox~m1~y to the British line, will make it an obJe<:t of attack m time of war, unless it be protected by the

250,000

9
presence of a respectab_le force there. It m~y also beco:111e
a point of concentration_ of !roops for. mmor ~ffens1ve
movements, by way of d1vers10n _; and 1s thus, 1~ every
view entitled to seasonable attention. An extensive barrack-~stablishment, together with batteries and such fieldworks as might be thrown up at brief notice, would be
sufficient.
Estimated expense 6. Fort Niagara to be re~uilt.-A_ f~rt at_ t~is po_sition is important, on th·e assumption_(adm1ttmg, 1t 1s believed, of but
little doubt) that, in time of war, there would be some naval preparations on Lake Ontario. It commands the entrance into the Niagara river; and a work here will shut
the enemy's vessels out from that harbor, yrhile it will
afford protection under which ours may take shelter in
case of need.
,
Estimated expense for repairs of buildings, and new barracks there
7. Fort at Oswego.-The growing importance of Oswego,
the relation it bears to the great line of internai communication to the west, and its exposed situation, directly on
the shore of the lake, whence it might be assailed by armed
vessels without the co-operation of a land attack, call for
works of defence to protect the harbor, and thus secure a safe.
retreat for our vessels in case of need, while we shut out
those of the enemy. Besides, this place possesses many
advantages for naval preparations for vessels not of great
draught of water, and would probably be made a subordinate depot in time of war.
Estimated expense for barracks, quarters, storehouses, and
magazine
8. Fort at Sackett's I-Iarbor.-In the event of naval arma- ·
ments to any considerable extent being resorted to on
Lake Ontario, Sackett's Harbor, from its bold water~ and
its excellence as a harbor, would at once become a depot
of great importance, the safety of which should be en.sured
against the enterprises of the enemy, by the timely construction of appropriate works of defence. Situated directly opposite to the strong point of Kingston, on the
Canadian side, and adjacent to the head of the St. Lawrence, it is one of the points at which a concentration of
troops may become expedient for the defence of that portion of the frontier and the protection of the naval depot.
The barrack accommodations already established there
are deemed sufficient, and it remains to fortify the approuch to the harbor.
Estimated expense of fort and barracks, within
9. Fort at the narrows of the St. Lawrence, below Ogdensburg.-The chief object of a work here would be to cut
off the enemy's communication by the river, between
Montreal and Kingston, and thus prevent him from availing himself of that channel for the transportation of troops
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.,
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75,000
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and supplies, if we cannot entirely secure it to ourselves.
By this obstruction on the. St. Lawrence, he would be
thrown altogether upon his back line of communication
by the Ottowa, which, although it has the merit of being
more secure from interruption, is longer, and more difficult, especially in seasons of drought. This would a]so
be another point from which the enemy might be menaoed; and from which auxiliary movements might be
made, in aid of the chief attack.
Estimated expense of fort and barracks
10. Fbrt near the line on Lake Cliamplain.-A work here
may be made to command the pass of the lake, and is
considered by far the most important of any proposed on
the whole line of frontier.
The position of Lake Champlain is somewhat peculiar.
While Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior stretch their
whole length directly along the border (forming, in fact, the
boundary), Champlain extends deeply into our territory, at
right angles with the line of the frontier ; and, while its
southern extremity reaches almost to the Hudson, it finds
its outlet, to the north, in the St. Lawrence, nearly midway
between Montreal and Quebec, the two great objects of attack. This is u,ndoubtedly the avenue by which the British possessions may be most effectually assailed; while, at
the same time, it would afford to the enemy possessing a
naval ascendency, equal facilities for bringing the war within our own borders, if it be left unfortified.. It therefore
becomes ii)lportant to fortify a point as near the line as practicable, so as to shut out the enemy's vessels, and thus effect the deuble object of protecting the interior shores of the
lake from the predatory attacks to which they would otherwise be exposed, and of Recuring it to ourselves, as the
great channel by which our troops and supplies may be
rapidly thrown forward to the poi1.1ts of attack or defence.
For a permanent work on Stony point (New York), including purchase of site - $300,000
For a permanent work on Windmill point (Vt.), including purchase of site
- 300,000

11. Barrack establishment and depot at Plattsburg.-In the
event of war, Plattsburg will become the great depot for the
operations on the Champlain frontier, the point of concentration of troops preparatory to any offensive movements
and the station of the reserve to sustain those movements'
and the posts that may be established in advance. EveX:
in ti~e of pe~ce, a respec!able force should be posted here,
especially durmg the contmuance of the boundary question
and border disturbances. Barracks for a regiment at least
with suitable storehouses, are recommended to b; erected'
on a plan admitting of extension, if required and also of
s~itable def ive arrang ments.
'
timate xp n e f ompleting the works in proo-ress on the
ale h r suggested.
_
_
_

$100,000

600,000

150,000

11
12. From Lake Champlain, eastward, the geographical features of the frontier materially change character, and require a corresponding modification of the means of defence.
The line no longer intersects great lakes, admitting of naval
preparations 7 nor binds on straits .and rivers, the navigati~n
of which may be controlled or interrupted by fortifications.
It is altogether inland, until it reaches the St. Croix, where
the principles that have been applied to other portions of
the frontier similarly situated will again become applicable.
·Running on a parallel of latitude to the Connecticut river,
and thence along· a chain of highlands, not yet clearly defined, to the province of New Brunswick, there are, perhaps, no points immediately on the frontier sufficiently
commanding, of themselves, to call, for the establishment
and maintehance of fortifications, or works of defence.
Should it ever become necessary to sustain, by force, our title
to the territory now in dispute, it must be done, not by isolated forts along the frontier, commanding, probably, nothing
beyond the range of their own guns ; but by an aotive army, competent not.only to occupy the country and hold it,
but also to assume the offensive, if necessary, and carry the
war beyond our borders.
But while it is· not deemed expedient to construct a chain of
forts along this portion of the frontier, it is considered a
proper measure of precaution, in the present state of our
relations with the British provinces, that positions should
be selected, and. preparatory arrangements made, for the establishment of depots of supplies at the head of navigation
on the Kennebec and Penobscot. In the event of movements in that' quarter, these would be proper points for the
concentration of troops, and would serve as a base of operations, whether these should be offensive or defensive in
their character.
Estimated expense of storehouses and other accommodations
13. Fort at Calais, on the St. Croix river.-A work here,
while it will serve to cover that part of the State of Maine
from the attacks· to which it would otherwise be exposed,
may, from its advanced positiqn, be made to act · an important though indirect part in the defence of the more northern portion of the frontier. Calais appears to be a very eligible point for the concentration of troops, with reference to
existing circumstances. A strong force stationed here,
threatening the enemy's posts on the lower St. John's, and
held ready to strike in that direction, in case of movements
from New Brunswick toward the disputed territory, could
not fail to have a decisive influence on such movements ;
since it is obvious that they could not be made with safety,
while exposed to attack in flank and rear, and to have their
line of communication intercepted, and their depots seized,
' b7 a prompt movement on our part from the St. Croix.
Est1mat~d expense of fort and barracks
14. In reference to the northern frontier, generally, it is be-

$150,000 ,

100,000
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lieved that, beside the defences which have been suggested along the border, chiefly for purposes of local protection, there should be a great central station at some
position in the interior at which troops might be assembled
for instruction, and where they would still be within ,
supporting distance of the more exposed parts of the
frontier.
·T urning our views inland, in search of some single position
at which preparations might be made for extended operations on this frontier, and from which aid and succor
could always be speedily derived-some position which,
while it shall be equally near to many important points
of the enemy's possessions, shall afford at no time any indication of the direction in which our efforts are to be
made ; which will, if it be possible7 unite the opposite
qualities of being at the same time remote and proximate,
far as to distance, but near as to time; which, while it
brings a portion of the military resources of the country
to the support of the inland frontier, and places them in
the best attitude for operations in that quarter, whether
defensive or offensive, at the same time takes them not
away from the seacoast. Looking for these various prop- .
erties, we find them all united, in a remarkable degree,
in the position of Albany.
From this place by steamboat, canal-boat, or railroad car,
troops and munitions could be transported in a short time
to Buffalo, or onward to Detroit, to Oswego, tu Sackett's
Harbor, to Plattsburg, to Boston, and along the coast of New
England; to New York by steamboat now, and soon by railroad also; and thence onward to Philadelphia, Baltimore,
Washington, and the heart of the southern c01mtry, if
necessary. In a word, Albany is a great central position,
from which radiate the principal lines of communication
to the north, to the south, to the east, and to the west; and
combines so many advantages for a military depot, that
the expediency of occupying it, and thus availing ourselves of those advantages, would seem to be manifest.
Estimat~ expense of the purchase of land, and the construction of barracks and other buildings
$300,000
Total for northern frontier

-

2,112,500

Coast from Passamaquoddy Bay to Cape Florida.
We will conduct the examination geographically, beginning at the north~as~ern ex~r~mity, and referring, in every case, to accompanying tables,
~hich exh1b1t the several works in the order of relative importance ,as to
tune.
The eastern harbors of aine _are exposed in a peculiar manner. Th~y
are n~t only on the flank of our lme, but they are also quite near the public
establishments of the greatest of maritime powers. They are, moreover, as
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yet, backed by only a thin population, and are, cons~quently, weak as ~ell
as exposed. The time may not, however, be very distant when, beconung.
wealthy and populous, they will be objects of a full portion of the national
solicitude. Works designed for these harbors must, therefore, be calculated for the future--must be founded on the principle that they must defend places much more important than any now existing there ; that, being near the possessions of a foreign power, they will be, i~ a particular·
manner, liable to sudden and repeated attacks~ and that, lymg at the extremity of the coast, they are liable to be but tardily succored. The works
must, consequently, be competent to resist escalade, and to hold out for a
few days. Feebler works might be morP- injurious than beneficial : theirweakness would, in tl:ie first place, invite attack; and, it being often a
great advantage to occupy fortified places in an adversary's territory, the ·
enemy could prepare himself to remedy the deficiencies of the forts, after
they should fall into his hands, by adding temporary works, by providing
strong garrisons, and by aiding the defence with his vessels.
No surveys have been made of these harbors, and no plans form_e d for
their defence. It may be well to observe here, once for all, that much
confidence is not asked for the mere conjectures presented below, as to the
number and cost of the works assigned for the protection of ,the harbors
which have not yet been surveyed. In some cases there may be mistakes
as to the number of forts and batteries needed, in others errors will exist in
the estimated cost.
Eastport and Machias may be mentioned as places that will unquestionably be thought to need defensive works by the time, in the order of"
. relative importance, the execution of them can be undertaken by.the Government. There are several small towns eastward of Mount Desert island
that may, at that period, deserve equal attention ; at present, however, the·
places mentioned will be the only ones estimated for, and $100,000 will be
assumed as the cost at each.-(Statement l, table F.)
Mount Desert island, situated a little east of Penobscot ba,r, having a
capacious and close harbor, affording anchorage for the highest class or
vessels, and easily accessible from sea, offers ·<! station for the navy of an
enemy superior to any other on this part of the coast. From this point his
cruisers might act with great effect against the navigation of tJ..Je eastern
coast, especially that of M11ine, and his enterprises could be conducted with
great rapidity against any points · he might select. These considerations,
added to the very great advantage, in certain political events, of our occupying a naval station thus advanced, whence we might act offensively,.
together with the expediency of providing places of succor on a part of the
coast where vessels are so frequmtly perplexed in their navigation by the ·
prevailing fog_s, lead to the conclusion that the fortification, in a strong
ID?,n~er, of this roadstead may, before long, be necessary. A survey of"
this island was begun many years ago, but the, party being called off to
other duties, it was never completed. 'I1he project of defensive works 'has
not been made. The entire cost may be, as assumed by the Engineer
Department some years ago, $5OO,OOO.-(~tatement I, table F,)
Castine.-It would seem to be impossible, on this coast, to deprive
an enemy enjoying naval superiority of harbors, or prevent his using
t~em as stations during war, insular situations being_s0 numerous, which
his Tessels would render unapproachable : but it seems proper that
such of these positions as are the sites of towns, should be secured. Du-
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rm.g the last war the English held the position of Castine for sometime,
and left it at their pleasure. It is probable that a work costing about
·$ 50,000 would deter an enemy from again making choice of this position.
(Statement 1, table F.)
Penobscot bay.-Vpon this bay, and upon the river of the same name,
flowing into it, are several flourishing towns and villages. Of the many
bays which intersect the coast, the Penobscot is the one which presents the
greatest number of safe and capacious anchorages. As before observed,
a large portion of these harbors must, for the present, be left without defences, but the valuable commerce of the bay and river must be covered;
and, to afford a secure retreat for such vessels as may be unable to plaee
themselves under the protection of the works to the east or west of the
bay, the passage of the river must be defended. The lowest point at
which this can be done, without great expense, is opposite Bucksport, at
the "narrows." A project has been given in for a fort at that position, estimated at $150,000.-(Statement 1, table D.)
St. George's bay, Broad bay, Damariscotta, and 8/ieeJls Out.-West
of the Penobscot occur the abovementioned bays, all being deep indentations, leading to towns, villages, and various establishments of indHstry
and enterprise. The bays have not been surveyed, and of course no plans
have been formed for their defence. $400,Q00 are assigned to the defence
of these waters. The Sheep's Cut is an excellent harbor of refuge for
vessels of every size.--(Stateme1t.t I, table F.)
Kennebec river.-This river (one of the largest in the eastern States)
enters the sea nearly mdway between Cape Cod and the mouth of the St.
Croix. It rises near the source of the Chaudiere, which is a tributary of
the St. Lawrence, and has once served as a line of operations against
Quebec. The situation and extent of this river, the value of its products,
and the active commerce of several very flourishing towns upon its banks,
together with the excellence of the harbor within its mouth, will not permit its defence to be neglected. The surveys be,qan many years ago, were
never :finished. The estimated cost of defences~ as formerly reported by
the Engineer Department, was $300,000. Positions near the mouth will
permit a secure defence.-(Statement 1, table D.)
Portland harbor.-The protection of the town, of merchantmen belenging to it, and of the ships of war that mav be. stationed in this harbor, to
watch over this part of the coast, or that may enter for shelter (all of them
important objects), may be secured, as an in.spection of the map of the harbor will show, by occupying Fort Preble point, House island, Hog Island
Ledge, and Fish point.
If the two channels to t~e west and cast of Hog island can be obstructe~ at small expe~se (to decide which some surveys are yet necessary), there
wil~ be no necessity for a battery on the ledge; and Fish point need be oceupied only by such works as may be thrown up in time of war. The
expense, as now estimated, of the works planned for this defence, will be
$155,000 for Fort Preble, and $48,000 for House island ; for Hog island
channel, say $135,000.-(Statetnent 1, tables D, E, and F.)
Saco, Kennebunk, ar_id York.-Small works, comparatively, will cover
these places : $75,000 1s assumed as the aggregate cost.-(Statement 1,
table F.)
Portsr,wuth harbor. and navy-yard.-The only goqd roadstead or h~bor between Cape Elizabeth an~ Cape Ann, is Portsmouth harbor, within

,
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,the mouth of Piscataqua river. Line-of-battle_ sh~ps c~n ascend_as' high as
Fox point, seven miles above the town. !his s1tuat10n? sufficiently commodious for a secondary naval depot, designed to repair ves.sels .of w~r,
.:should be maintained ; but it is to be regretted that the bay to the south of
. Fox point was not cho~e°: as. the _site of the navy-rard,_ instead of Ferna\d's
island. Being where 1t 1s, 1t will be necessary, m time of war, to make
..some particular dispositions for the protection of the navy-yard from an at,.
tack from the north shore of the river.
The position of Fort Constitution will certainly, and that of Fort
;McCleary will probably, be occupied by the defences, though the works.
themselves should give place to such as will better fulfil the object. The
other positions for forts or batteries are Gerrish's point, Fishing island, and
Clark's island ; some, if not all of which, must be occupied. Surveys are
required before the projects can be formed, or before estimates can be
made; but there is reason for believing that the entire cost of fortifyi~g
this harbor will not fall short of $300,000.-(Statemeht I, table D.)
Newburyport harbor.-- 'rhe points forming the mouth ·o f the harbor are
-continually changing; and it seems necessary, therefore, to rely, fo..r the
defence of the harbor, on works to be thrown up during a war. There .is
-o nly a shoal draught of water. It is thought $100,000 will _defend this
·harbor adequately.-(Statement 1, table F.)
G,louceste'r harbor.-The position of this harbor, near the extremity of
-Cape Ann,. places it in close relation with the navigation of all Massachu:setts bay, and imparts to it considerable importance. No surveys have yet
-Qeen made, but it is believed that sufficient defence may be provided for·$200,000.- (Statement I, table E.) Should there be any occasion for defensive works before the proposed new works can be commenced, an expenditure of $10,000, in repairs on the old fort, will be required.-(Table A.)
· Beverly ltarbor.-This harbor will be defended chiefly by a portion of
the works designed for Salem. $50,000, in addition, will secure .it.,(Statement I, table F.)
Salem harbor.-The port of Salem is distant from Marblehead two
miles, and separated therefrom by a peninsula. 'rhe occupation of the
,extremity of Winter island (where are the ruins of Fort Pickering) on o~e
·side, and Naugus head on the other,' will effectually secure this harbor.
Projects have been presented for this defence estimated to cost $225,000.,(Statement I, tables D and F.) On a sudden emergency, old Fort Lee
may be put in an effective state for $2,000.-(Table A.) .
Marblehead harbor.-Beside covering, in some measure, the harbor of
Boston, Salem and Marblehead harbors possess an important commerce. of
t heir ow~; and also afford shelter for vessels prevented, by certain winds
from entering Boston, or pursuing their course eastward. The proposed
~ode of d~fending ~arblehead harbor consists in occupying, on the n'.otth
side, the hillock which commands the present Fort Sewall (which will be
-superseded by the new ~ork), and. on ~pe south, the position of Jack's
ipomt. The two works will cost $318,00tl.-(Statement 1, tables D and.'F .)
To repair old Fort SewalJ, which inay be necessary -if the new worb
are not soon begun, will -require $10,000,-(Table A.)
Boston h~rbor.- We come now to the most i:rpportant harbor in ,.the
eastern sect10n of the coast, and, considering the relation to genera~ commerce, and the mterests of the navy, one of ,the mo.st important Ill the

whole Union.
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After a .careful examination of all the necessary cond~ti~n~ o( 'such a
problem, the board of naval officers ~nd engineers, i:r_i _their JOmt report of
1820, gave this harbor a preference over all other pos1t10ns to the east, and
inclusive of New York bay and the Hudson, as the seat of the great northern naval depot; and the Government, by the great additions and improvements that have from year to year been since made to the navy-yard on the
ChaTlestown side, have virtually sanctioned the recommendation _of the
board. But, independent of the navy-yard, Boston is a city of great weal!h,
and possesses an extensive and active commerce.
The old works defended merely the interior basin from attacks by water;
but, as it often happens that vessels enter Nantasket roads with a wind too
scant to take them to the city, or are detained in President roads by light
winds or an adverse tide, as the former, especially, is a very convenient
anchorage fwhence to proceed to sea, and, above all, as N antasket roads
affords the best possible station for a blockading squadron, it was deemed
indispensable to place permanent defences at the mouth of the harbor.
The project of defence regards the existing works, with the necessary repairs and modifications, as constituting a second barrier.
Beside a permanent work, now well advanced, on George's island, it contemplates permanent works on Nantasket head-filling up the Broad sound
channel, so as to leave no passage in that direction for ships of war.
_
Until the best draught for steam-vessels of war shall be well ascertained,.
it will not be safe to say to what depth the Broad sound channel should be
restricted ; nor, indeed, can it be positively asserted that this description of
vessel can be conveniently excluded by such means. Other vessels can1
however, be thus excluded; and steam-vessels passing this channel would
still have to pass the inner barrier. The estimated cost of the works for
this harbor is $1 710,000.
.
Beside the works of a permanent character, it wi11 be necessary, in the
event of a war, to erect several temporary works on certain ·positions in theharbor, and on the lateral approaches to the navy-yard.-(Statement I,.
•
tables A, C, E, and F.)
Plymouth and Provincetown harbors.-These harbors have a commerce
of some consequence of their own ; but they are particular! y interesting in
reference to the port of Boston. While these are undefended, an enemy's
squadron blockading Massachusetts bay will have ports of refuge under
his lee, which would enable him to maintain hjs blockade, even throughout the most stormy seasons : knowing that the winds which would forcehim to seek shelter would be adverse to outward-bound, and fatal to such
inward vessels as should venture near the cape. Were the enemy deprived
of these harbors, he would be unable to enforce a rigorous investment, as
he would be constrfl,ined to take an offing on every approach of foul weather.
Our own vessels coming in from sea, and :finding an enemy interposed between them and Boston, or being turned from their course by adverse
winds, would, in case of the defence of these ports, find to the south of
Boston shelter equivalent to thQ e provided in the east, at Marblehead, Salem, Gloucester, and Portsmouth. Plymouth harbor has not been fully
surveyed. Provincetown harbor has been surveyed, but the projects of
defence have not een formed. The former, it is thought, may be suita~ly
cover:cd by a ·work of_ no great cost on Gumet point; while, to fortify
Provincetown harbor m such a way as to cover vessels takino- shelter
th rein, an at the amc time to deprive an enemy of safe, anchorto-es
will
b
,
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involve considerable expense. Pro.brtbly no neflrer \stimaty can be formed
,a t present.than that offered by the ~1~giq.,eer_Departn1;eht _s~m~ years a~o,
which gave $100,000 for Plymouth, and . $,(>_00,000 for Provmcetown,-:_
.
:
(Statement I, tables D an,d E.)
'rhe coast between Cape Cod and Cape H~tteras differs from the northeastern section, in" possessil)g fewer harbors, in having but little rocky, and
a great portion of sandy shore, in its milde~ cli?J,~te and 'clearer atm~:.
sphere · and it differs from all the other port10ns m"'the depth and magnitude ol its interior seas and sounds, and in the distance to which deep-tide
navigation extends up its numerous large rivers. The circuit of the coast,
not inclirdi~g the shores of the great bays~ measures 659 miles; while a
-straigh~ line from one of the abovenamed capes to the other, measures
about. 520 miles.
Martha's Vineyard Sound.-To t~e south of Cap~ Cod lie the.islands o,f
_Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard, which, with several smaller islands on
the south, and the projection of Cape Malabar on the east, enclose the
abovenamed sound. The channels through this sound being sufficient for
merchant vessels, 9-nd one of the channels permitting the passage even of
·small frigates, are not only the constant tract of coasting vessels, but also
-of large numbers of vessels arriving in · the tempestuous months from
foreign voyages. There 'are, within the sound, the Iiarbor·s of Tarpaulin
cove, Holmes's Hole, Edgartown, Fal.rnouth, Hyannis, and Nantucket, be.side smaller anchorages.
In addition to the many thousand vessels passing this water annually, a
portion, containing very valuable cargoes, and of which forty or fifty may
sometimes be seen in the harbors, awaiting a change of wind, there is supposed to be at least 40,000 tons of whaling vessels owned in the towns of
this sound.
· If the harbors just named are to be defen~ed at all, it must be by fortifications. There is .little or no population, except in the towns, and even
·th~s is beli~ved !ob~ entirely without _military organization. A privateer
might run mto either of these harbors and capture, destroy, or levy contributions at pleasure. The use of the sound itself, as ~n anchorage for vessels of war, cannot be prevented by fortifications alone. $250,0P0 may
perhaps: suffice for the defence of all the harbors against the kind of en~
1erprise to which they are exposed.-(Statement 1, table r.)
New Bedford and Fairhaven liarbor.-No. survey has been made of this
'harbor, on which lie two of.the most flourishing towns. It is easily- defensible; and the amount formerly assumed by the Engineer Department
will probably suffice, namely $30U,000:-(Statement 1, table D.)
Buzzard's ba1j.-lnterposed between the main and the island of Martha's
Vineyard, are the Elizabeth islands, which bound Buzzard's bay on the
.s outh. This bay covers the harbor of New Bedf@rd, and might be used
8:n an?horage by an enemy's fleet ; bat it is too wide to 9e defended _by for11ficat1ons.
·
Narraganset bay.-There ure three entrances into Nar:raganset roads:
1st. The eastern cl].annel, whiqh P?-sses up ~n the east side of the island
of Rhode Island. This being shut up by a solid bridge, needs no 4efonce,
by fortifications, other thail} a field-'worli or two, which may be thrown up
at the opening of a war.
,
·
.
'
2d. The central channel, which enters from sea by passing between
Rhode Island and Canonicu t island. This is J:>y far t11e best entrance, and
2
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leads to the best anchorage; and is to be defended by a fort on the east
side of the entrance, designed to be the principal work in the system. This
work, called Fort Adams, is nearly completed. On · the west side of the
entrance it is proposed to place another work ; and, on an island, called
Rose island, facincr the entrance, a third work. It is also proposed to repair the old fort o~ Goat island, just within the mouth ; and also old Fort
Green, which is a little higher up, and on the island of Rhode Island.
3d. As to the western passage, three modes present themselves: , 1st. By
reducing the depth of water by an artificial ledge, so as while the passage
shall be as free as it is now for the coasting trade, it ,shall be shut as to the
vessels of war, including steam-vessels. 2d. By relying on fortifications
alone to close the channel ; or, 3d. By resorting in part to one and in part
to the other mode just mentioned. Either is practicable ; but being the
'least expensive and most certain, the estimates are founded on the first.
The total cost of the Narraganset defences, is e~timated at $1,714,000.
(Statement 1, tables A, C, D, E, and F.) ·
·
Gardiner's 'bay.-lt is uncertain whether this harbor, which would be a
very valuable one to an enemy investing this .part of the coast, is defen~ible by fortifications alone. After it s_hall have been surveyed, it may appear that from one., or more positions the whole anchorage may be controlled by heavy s .a-mortars. In such a case, the defensive works would
not be costly. If ,.t be found expedient to fortify soµie particular portion
of the bay, as an anchorage for steam-batteries (which, ,however, is not anticipated), the expense would probably be as great as wa:s anticipated some
years since by the Engineer Department, viz., $400,000.-(Statement 1,.
table F.)
-Sag Harbor, New York, and Stonington, Connecticut.-Neither of these
harbors have been surveyed with reference to defence. 'I1he first is possessed of considerable tonnage ; and the second, beside being engaged in
commerce, is the terminus of a railroad from Boston. $100,000 may be
assigned to the first, and $200,000 to the other.-(Statement 1, tables E
and F.)
New London harbor is very impo:i:tant to the commerce of Lo,ng Island
sound; and, as a port of easy access, havbg- great depth of water, rarely
freezing, and being easily defended, it is a1i'""excellent station for the navy.
It is also valuable as a shelter for ·vessels bound out or home, and desirous
of avoiding a blockading squadron off Sandy Hook.
In the plan of ~efence, the present forts (Trumbull and Griswold) give
place to more efficient works, whereof the expense is estimated at $401,000.
(Statement 1, tables C and F.)
Mouth of Connecticut river.- Tbis river has been shown to be subject
to the expeditions of an enemy. No survey has been made with a view to
its defences. $100,000 is introduced here as the conjectural cost.-(Statement 1, table F.)
New Haven harbor.-It is proposed to defend this harbor by improving
and enlarging Fort Hale, and substituting a new work for the slight redoubt
erected during the last war called Fort Wooster. The expense of both
may be set down at $90,000, exclusive of $5,000 for immediate repairs of
old Fort Hale.-(Statement 1, tables A and F.)
There are several towns between New Haven and New York, on both
sides of the soun .
01;1e of ~em are very large as yet ; still most, if_not
~ll, are pro perous and mcreasmg. Although, in their present condition,
it might not be deemed necessary to apply any money to permanent de-
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fences, yet, as part of the present o?je?t is to ascert~in, as near as may be,
the ultimate cost of completely fortifymg the c_oast, 1t seems proper to look
forward to the time when some of these towns may become objects of pred~
atory enterprises of s~me magnitu~e. Bearing ~n D?ind the probable increase of population lJl the meantime,_ and the s1tuat10n of. the places generally, it is thought that $200,000 will be enough to provide defences (or
all.-(Statement 1, table F.)
New York harbor.-The objects of the projected-works for the security
of New York are, to cover the city from an attack by land or sea ; to protect its numerous shipping; to prevent, as far as possible, the blockade of
this great port ; and to cover the interior communication uniting this harbor with the Delaware. In the present condition of the defences, an enemy would encounter no great opposition, whether his attack were made by
land or water.
·'
There ·are two avenues to the city, namely : one by the main channel,
direct from sea, and one by the sound. If an enemy come by the way of
the sound, he may now land his forces on the New York side, at Hell-gate,
within less than ten miles of New York, and the next day, at the latest, b~
in the city; or, he may land on the Long Island side, at the same distance,
and in the same time be master of the navy-yard and of Brooklyn heights,
whence the city of New York is perfectly commanded; or, he may divide
Ii.is forces, and reach both objects at the same moment.
The projected system of defence closes this avenue at. the greatest distance possible from the city, namely, at Throg's point. The occupation
of this point will force the enemy to land more than twenty miles,from the
~ity on one side, and still farther from the navy-yard on the other. ·
.
A work now in progress at Throg's point will probably prevent any ·attempt to force this passage. It will, as we have seen, oblige an enemy to
land at a considerable distance from the object ; and as he will then be
unable to turn the ~trong position afforded l.ry Harlem river, the cover on
the New York side will be sufficient.
· But should he land on the Long Island side, he might, by leaving parties on suitable positions, with a view to prevent our crossing the river and
falling on his rear, make a dash at the navy-yard, having no obstacle in
his front. To prevent this effectually, and also to accomplish other objects,
a work should he erected on WiP~ins's point, opposite Throg's point. This
work, beside completing the defence of the channel, wou,ld involve a march
against the navy-yard from this quarter in gre~t danger; since all the forces
that could be collected on the New York shore might, under cover of this
work, be crossed over to Long Island, and fall on the rear cu tl1e enemy
cutting- off his communication with the fleet. The two works on Throo-';
and Wilkins's points may, therefore, be regarded as perfectly protecting, ~u
that side, the city and navy-yard.
Against an attack by the main channel, there arelst. The works in the vicinity of the city, which would act upon an enemy's squadron only after its arrival before the place. They consitt of
Fort Columbus, Castle Williams, and South Battery, on Governor's island,
Fort Wood, on Bedlow's island, and Fort Gibson, on Ellis's island.
It is necessary that these works be maintained, because, in the event of the
lower barrier being forced, these would still afford a resource. It is a disadvantage of their positions, however, that the destruction of the city might be
going simultaneously :with the contest between these forts and the fleet.
j
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They cnnnot, however, ·b e dispensed with, until the outer barriers are·~ntirely
1
,
, , ,
,
~ ,.
completed, if' even then.
2d. At the Narrows, about seven miles below the city, the passag~ becomes-·
so ·contracted as . to permit good disposition to be ;made for defence. ,, On -th.e
Long Island side of the Narrows, is Fort Lafayette, whioh is a strong ,water
battery, standing on a reef, at some distance from the shore, and immediately,
behind it, on the top of the bank, is a small b-1et strong work, called Fo.rt
Hamilton. Some repairs being ~pplied to these works, this position may be
regarded as well occupied .
On the west side, or S taten Island side of the Narrows, are the following
works, belonging to the State of New York, viz.: Fort Richmond, which is
a water-battery ; Battery Hudson, which is at some height above the water-;
Battery Morton, which is a small battery on the top of the hill ; ar1d Port
Tomkins, which is also on the top of the hill, and is the principal woik:
All these need great repairs ; but, being once in proper order, would afford lJ/
very important contribution to the defence of the passage ; nothing further,
indeed, being contemplated for this position, except the construction of -a
small 'redoubt on a commanding hill, a little to the southwest. The repairs .
of these works cannot too soon be taken in hand ; and it is hoped -son:ie
arrangement may soon be made with_the State authorities to that ernt
With the Narrows thus defended, and the works near the city in perfect
order, New York might be regarded as pretty well protected against an attack
by water through this passage.
1
But there lies below the ]~farrows a capacious bay, affording good anchor~e
for any number of vessels of war and transports. An enemy's squadron bemg
in that bay, into which entrance is very easy, would set a seal upon this outlet of the · harbor. Not a vessel could enter or depart at any season of• the
year. And it would also intercept the water communication, by the way of
the Raritan, between New York and Philadelphia.
_1
The same squadron could land a force on the beach of Gravesend Bay
(the place of the landing of the British, which brought on the battle-of Long
Island, in the Revolutionary war), within seven miles of the city, of Brook,.
Jyn, of it~ commanding height, and of the navy-yard with no intervening
obstacle of any sort.
This danger is imminent, ancl it would not fail, in the event of a war,, to
be as fully realized as it was during the last war; when, on the rumor of an
expedition being in preparation in Englaad, twenty-seven thousand militia
were assembled to cover th e city from an attack of this sort. It is apparent
that the defences near the city, and those at the Narrows, indispensable as
they are for other purposes, cannot be made to prevent this enterprise; which
can be thoroughly g uarded against only by
3d. An ou ter ban-ier, at the very m outh of the harbor. This would accomplish h_vo objects of &'r~at consequence; namely, rendering a close blockade_1mposs1ble; and obl1gmg an en emy, who should design to move troops
~runs~ the navy-yard, to land at a distance of more than twenty miles from
his obJ ct, upon a dangerous beach ; leaving, during the absence of the
troops, the transports at anchor in the ocean, and entirely without shelter.
~he h azards of such a land expeuition would, m oreover be greatly enhanced
by the fact that our own troops, by passing over to Lon~ Island under cover
of the f~rt t Wil~in's oint, ·oul<l cut off the return ~f the ~nemy to h is
m t h n or ~omcwhcre near Rockaway; time, distance, and
t, :vlu
cl1rcct1on of the re pect1ve marches, would make, very naturally, such a
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manreuvre a part of the plan of defence. Against an enemy landing in
Gravesend' Bay", no such manreuvre~could ~e e~ect?,al, on _a ccount of ,the
shortness of his line of march; as well as of ~ts d1rect10n.
.
.
,, In view of these considerations,the board of engineers projected-additional
works -one for the east bank, and another for the middle ground; these
'Positidns,being on shoals on either hand of the bar, outside o[ Sandy Hook.
,Before determining ori the works last mentioned, the board went ,ipto much
research in order to ascertain whether the shoals were unchangeable; and it was
''thought to have been fully proved that there had been .no material alte_ration
'in more than sixy years. This apparent stability of the shoals encouraged
. ,
.
the board to devise the project referred to.
.. ·Recent surveys have, however, discovered a new, or rather another channel.
If it be indeed a ne?,D channel, it shows a want of stability in the shoals, .that
: Jotbids ahy such structures as the contemplated batteri_es; and it may be necessary· to resort to other means. Suitable means exist, unquestionably,
though it may not be best to decide on them until all doubt as to the fixed
changing nature of the channel shall be removed; especially, as it must ne·cessarily be some time before , the completion of mom indispensable works
will allow the commencement of these. This may, however, be said with
certainty, namely: that, all other means failing, works may be erect~d o·n
Sandy Hook, which will have a g9od action upon the channel, and under
..cover of which, bomb-k-.etches or steam-batteries, or , both, may lie. With
such an arrangement, there would be little probability of the lower bay being
.
.
occupied as a blockading- station.
To recapitulate :-The security of the city of New York and the navyyard requires-first, defences on the passage from the sound, namely: the
completion of Fort Schuyler, on Throg's point, and the erection of a fort
on Wilkins's point-cost of both $866,000; second, the repa'ir ' of works
on Governor's island, on. Bedlow's island, and on Ellis's island-estimated
cost $155,000; third, the repair of the works at the Narrows, including the
works belonging to the State-cost $450,000; and fourth, the erection of
outer defences on or near Sandy Hook-estimated by the board of engineers
to cost $3,362,824.
·The total cost, exclusive of these last, will therefore be $1,471,000; or, including these, $4,833,824.-(Statement 1, tables A, O, and F.)
Delawar~ bay, Fort Delaware, Fort Mijflin, Delaware breakwater.-The
coast from the mouth of the Hudson to the Chesapeake, a~ well as that on
the south side of Long island, is low and sandy, and is penetrated ·by several
inlets; but not one, beside the- D_elg.ware, is navigable by sea-going vessels.
The Delaware bay itself being wide, and full of shoals, having an intricate
cbannel , and being much obstructed by ice in the winter, affords :no very
good natural harbor within a reasonable distance of the sea.
The artificial harbor now in course of construction near Cape Henlopen
will, it is hoped, fully supply this need ; in which event, it must be securely
fortified. No plans have, however, as yet been made with that object; and
as to the probable cost, nothing better can now be done than to assume the
conjectural estimate made some years sine~ in the Engineer Department,
, ,
namely, $600,000.-(Statement 1, table F.)
The lowest point at which the bay 1s defensible is at. Pea-patch island,
about forty~five miles below the city of Philadelphia. A fort on th~tisl~nd,
to replace the one destl'oyed by fire; a fort opposite the Pea-patcli,.on the
Delaware shore, to assist in commanding the Delaware chal)nel. anp at the
1

or
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same time protect the mouth of the Delaware and Chesapeake canal; a temporary work on the Jersey shore, to be thrown up at the commencement of.a
war, to assist in closing the channel on that side ; together with floating obstructions, to be put down in moments of peril, will effectually cover all
above this position-including Philadelphia and its navy-yard, Wilmington,
New Castle, the canal before mentioned, and the Philadelphia and Baltimore
railroad.
The commencement of the rebuilding of Fort Delaware being delayed
by difficulties attending the settlement of new claims to the island on w,hich
it is to stand, Fort Mifflin, which is an old work, about seven miles below
the city of Philadelphia, has been put in good order. This work is ready to
receive its armament and its garrison.
The expense of the work on Fort Delaware may be estimated at $491,000,.
and of the fort opposite, $ 521,000.-(Statement 1, tables O and F.)
Chesapeake bay.-The board of naval officers and engineers 1ntrusted with
the selection of sites for a great northern and a great southern naval depot,
recommended, in their joint reports of 1819 and 1820, 'Burwell's bay, on
James river, for the one; and Charlestown, in Boston harbor, for the other.
They also recommended Boston harbor and N arraganset bay, at the north, and
Hampton roads, at the south, as chief naval rendezvous. In those reports
the commissioners entered at large into the consideration of all the matters
rel~ting to these important objects, and reference is now made to those reports
·
for many interesting- details.
Hampton roads, "James river, Noifolk, and the nam;-yard.-The works
proj ected for the defence of these are, 1st, a fort at Old Point Comfort-this
is called Fort Monroe; 2d, a casemated battery; called Fort Calhoun, on the
Rip Rap shoals, opposite Old Point Comfort ; and 3d, a line of floating obstructions extending acrnss the channel from one of these works to the other.
It was the opinion of the commissioners above mentioned, that, in the event
of a great naval depot being fixed on James river, it might ultimately be proper to provide additional strength, by placing works on the positions of Newport news, W assaw shoals, aud Craney island flats. Such an expansion has,
however, since then, been given to the present navy-yard at Gosport (opposite Norfolk), that there is little probability of any other position on these
waters being occupied for such purposes.
The great importance of retaining Hampton roads during a war, and of
covering the navy-yard, is conceded on all hands. 'I1he bearing of this harbor upon the general defence of the Chesapeake bay is, perhaps, equally well
understood; it being very evident that a small hostile force would reluctantly
venture up the bay, or into York river, or the Rappahannock, or any of the
upper har9ors, leaving behind them a great naval station, and th,e common
rendezvous of the southern coast- a station seldom, in time of war, without
the presence of a number of vessels just ready for, or just returned from sea.
Altho~g~ there is m~ch important work to be done to complete Fort
Monroe, 1t 1s even now_ m a state to cont~ibute large) y to the defence of the
roadstead; and there 1s nJ dou bt that m a very short time all the casemated parts may be perfectly ready to receive the armament.
rhis work will _be found in statement 1, table c, $ 138,367 being required to complete 1t.
Fort . alhoun cann_ot yet be carried forward for want of stability in the
foundation. The artifi 1al mass on which it is to stand having been rais~
out ot the water, the walls of the battery were begun some years since, but 1t
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-was soon found that their weight caused consi~er~ble sµbsidence. 0~ an
inspection by engineer officers, it was t~en dec1ded to ~eep the fou~da!10ns
·loaded with more than the whole weight of the fimshed work, until all
:su.bsidence has ceased. The ,load had hardly_be~n put on, however, be:foi:e it was injudiciously determined to take it off and · begin to build,
·although the settling was still going on. H~ppily, a better policy prevailed
before t.he construction w,as resumed, qut not before the very considerable
expense of removing the load had been infurred, and the further e~pense
,of replacing it rendered ne,cessary...,-(Statem~n,t I, table C.) Reqmred to
complete the work, $356,000.
·
-It may be expedient, in ·time of war, bY. way of providing ·iµteri9r barriers, to erect batteries on Craney island, at the mouth of Elizabeth river,
·and to put in condition and arm old Fort No-rfolk, :which is just below the
,city. '
Harbor of St. Mary.;_ The centrnl situation (as regards the Chesapeake)
,of this fine basin, its relation to .the Potomac, its depth of water, and the
facility with which it may be defended, indicate its fitness as a harbor of
refuge for the commerce., of the Chesapeake bay, and as an occasional, if
not constant, station _during war of a portion of the,naval force. A survey
has been made, but no project has been forme,d. The Engineer Depart.. ment, some years agQ, conjectured that the cost of defences in this harbor
might amoun,t to -$ 300,000.-(Statement 1, table :f.) · ,
·
Annapolis h:arbor.-c-No surveys or plans of defence have been made.
·The existing works are inefficient and quite out of repair. A former esti·mate made by the Engineer Department, amounting to $250,Q00, is adopted
·here.-(Statement 1, table F.)
.
· ,
·
Harbor of Baltimore.~ The proximity of t11is city to Chesapeake hay
g reatly endangers the city,. of Baltimore. In the pre.sent state of things, an
enemy, in a few hours' ma:i:ch, after an easy landing, and wi_thou,t having
;his communication with his fleet seriously endangered, can .make himself
master of that great emporium of commerce. There are' require_d for its
·security two forts on the Patapsco, one at Hawkins's point, and the other
\Qpposite that point, .at the extreme end of the flat that runs off from Sollers's
point, these being the lowes~ positions at which the passage of the Patap~co
can be well defended. Beside the advantages that will ,result, qf 9,bligmg
the enemy to land at a greater distance, thereby gaining time, by delayfr1g
.his march, for the arrival of succor, and preventing his tu,r ning the defen~ive positions which our troops might oc,cupy, it will be impossible, for him
to endanger the city by a direct attack by water.
The present Fort McHenry, Redoubt Wood, and Covington battery,
·should be ratained as a second barrier. The firstmentioned is now in
good condition, and the repairs required for the others. may be applied at
the beginning of a war.
,
The fort on Sollers's point flats, which should be :first commenced, 'is estimated to cost $1,000,O00.-(Statement I, table D.)
The fort on· Hawkins's point (to be found in statement 1, table F) will
'
·cost, it is supposed, $376,000.
Mouth of Elk river.-The completion of the line of water communication from the Delaware to the waters of the Chesapeake-makes it pl'Oper to
place a fort somewhere near the mouth of Elk river, in order to prevent an
enemy from destroying, by a sudden enterprise, the works forI?ing this
-outlet of the canal. There have been no surveys made with a view to esL
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tablish such protection, which is estimated at $50,000.-(Statement· l,,
table F.)
·
.
.
,.
Cities· of Washington, Georgetown, and Alexandria.-F?rt Washmg-ton covers these cities from any attack by water, and will oblige an enemyto land at some eight or ten miles' below Alexandria, sho11l~ that city be
,his object, and about twice as far b~low W ashingt~n. It will_ a~s~ se~ve
the very important purpose of covermg troops crossmg from Vug1ma with
a Yiew to fall on the flanks of an enemy moving against the capital from
the Patuxent or the Chesapeake. To put the necessary repairs on Fort
Washington will cost about $30,000.-(See statement 1, table A.)
Cedar point, Potomac river.-But all these objects would have been
b~tter fulfilled had the work been placed at Lower Cedar point. As it .is,.
however, the contemplated works 1eing constructed in the Patuxent,_and
the militia of the surrounding country in a due state of preparation, an en. terprise against Washington would b~ a hazardous 01').e.
_ As gjving complete security to the towns in the District, covering moret han sixty miles in length of the Potomac and the Patuxent, the work on
'Cedar point should not be omitted. There have been no surveys made of
·-~he ground, nor projects of the fort, which, in a conjectural estimate of the,
Engineer Department, was set down at $300,000. (Statement 1, table E.)
Patuxent river.-The more effectually to protect the city of Washington
{rom a sudden attack by troops landed at the head of navigation in the Pa~tuxent, and to provide additional shelter for vessels in the Chesapeake, a fort
has been planned to occupy Point Patience, and another to occupy J:homas's point, both a short distance up the river. The ··work on, Thomas's_point:
is. (in statement 1, table D) estimated at $250,000; and the work on Point
Patience (in statement 1, table F) estimated to cost $246,000.
.
Ocracock Inlet, N. O.-The shallowness of the water on the bars at this
inlet effectually excludes all vessels of war-at least, all moved by sails.
But as this is an outlet of an extensive commerce, and as through this opening attempts might be made in small vessels, barges, or the smaller class of
steam-vessels, to destroy this commerce, or to interrupt the line of interior
water communication, timely preparation must be made of temporary .works
equal to defence against all such minor enterprises.
Beaufort harbor, N. C.-A work called Fort Macon has been erected for
the defence of this harbor, which will require some repairs. Some operations are also cnlled for to protect the site from the wearing action of the sea.
(Statement 1, table A.) Estimate, $ 10,000.
.
Mouths of Cape Fear river, N C.-The defence of the main channel
of Cape Fear requires, in addition to Fort Caswell (now nearly completed\
on Oak island, another fort, to be situated on Bald Head. And the defence
of the smaller channel will require a redoubt on Federal point. The battery, magazine, block-house, &c., at Smithville, should remain as accessori s. F01~t Caswell, Oak island (statement 1, table C), requires $6,000 _to
compl te 1t; the fort on Bald Head (statement 1, table F) will reqmre
1 , 00; the redoubt on Federal point (statement 1, table F) wil1 require
1 ,0 0; and the battei:;y, &c., called Fort Johnston, at Smithville (statement 1 ta le A), 5,000.
Georgetow'!1' ha7:bor, . C.-_The first inlet of any consequence south of
Cape . ar nver !s at. the umte<l mouths of the Waccamaw, Pedee, and
Black n rs, 1i rmmg
orgetown harbor; which is a commodious and caciou bay, ving suffi ient water within, and also upon the bar near the
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mouth, for .merchant vessels and small vessels of war. A survey of .~h,h:r
harbor was begun many years ago, but never complete~; and no projects
for defence have been made. It is probable that a work placed near Moscheto creek, or on Winyaw point, ·wou]d give adequate strength at the cost
of about $250,000. (S laternent 1, table E.) .
,
Santee river and Bull's bay.-About ten miles south from Georgetown,
·are the mouths of the Santee, the largest river in South Carolina. It is not
known whether the burs at the mouths of this river have sufficient water for
sea-going· vessels. The · same un~ertainty exists_as to the ,depth into Bull's
,bay. It may be sufficient to cons~der these, and the other mlets betwe~n
Georgetown and Charle;:;ton, as calling· for small works, capable of resisting
boat enterprises, and to assign as the cost $100,000. Should they prove to
be ·navigable for privateers, they will require a larger expenditure. (Statement I, table F.)
·
Charleston, S. C.-This city, situated at the junction of Ashley and
Cooper rLvers, is about five miles, in a direct liny, from the sea. Between it
and the ocean there is a wide and safe roadstead for vessels -of any draught.
Upon the bar, lying three or four miles ou(side of the , harbor, there is, how- ever, only \\;at.er enough for smaller frigates and sloops of war. On the
southwest side of the, hg.rbor is James's island, in which are several serpentine passages, more or less navigable for boats, barges, and small steam-vessels : some of them communicate directly with the sea and Stono river ..
Whappoo cut, the most northerly I?assage from the Stono· to Charleston harbor, enters Ashley river opposite the middle of the city.
Interior natural water communicatio9-s exist, also, to_the southwest of
Stono river, connecting this with North Edis_to river; the latter with South
Edisto and St. Helena's sound; this, again, with Broad river; and, finally,,
,this last with Savannah river.
.
On the north side of the harbor of Char'. eston lies Sullivan's island, separated from the main by a channel navigable 0n]y by small craft. On the
northwest side of this island is au interior water communication, which ex-tends to Bull's bay, and even bey01~d, to the harbor of Georgetown.
From this sketch it is apparent that it will not do to restrict the defences,
to the principal entrance of the harbor. The lateral avenues must also beshut. And it is probable that accurate surveys of all these avenues will show
· that the best method of defending them will be by works at or near the·
mouths of the inlet, as the enemy w,ill be keJ?t thereby at a gteater distance·
from the city ; the lesser harbors formed by these inlets will be protected ; and the line of interior water communication will be inaccessible from
the sea.
No position for the defence of the principal entrance to Charleston harbor.
can be found :qearer to the ocean than th~ westem extremity of .Sullivan'sisland. This is at present occµpied by Fort Moultrie-a work of sonic
strength, but by no means ~adequate to its o~ject; its battery being weak,
and the scarp so low as to ,oppose no serious obstacle to escalade. How far
this work, by a modification of its plan and relief, may be made to contribute
to a foll defence of the harbor, has not yet be~n determined. But so long
as it is the only work at this, the principal point of defence,- it must. be kept.
in good condition for service ; and no alterations that will disturb this efficiency should be undertaken. It is now ready to receive its guns.
On a shoal, nearly opposite to Fort Moultrie, the foundation of a fort
has been begun, which will have a powerful cross-fire with Fort Moultrie •.

'
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'This is called Fort Sumter. (Statement 1, table C.) To complete this work
wjll require, it is estimated, $201,000.
IQ. the upper part of the harbor is Castle Pinckney, on Shuter's Folly
island. This work is now ready to receive its guns.
Stono, North Edisto, and South Edisto.-All these must be fortified, at
least in such a manner as to protect these inlets from enterprises in boats or
.smal] vessels. To that end, $50,000 may be assigned to e'a ch.-(Statement
1, table F.)
- ,
St. Helena sound.-The proper defences cannot be pointed out till the
sound shall have been surveyed. Although there is supposed to be no great
depth of water on the bar, it is known t0 be navigable for the smaller class
of merchantmen, and for steamboats, and to have a navigable communication
with the head of Broad river, or Port Royal, intersecting the interior, nayigation between Charleston. and Savannah. The estimate is $150,000.-(Statement 1, table F.)
Broad river, or Port Royal roads.-The value of this capacious roadstead, as a harbor of refuge, depends on the depth that can be carried over
the bar; on the distance of this bar beyond the ]ine of coa~t; and on the
means that may be applicable of lessening the danger of croi'lsing it. This
is supposed to be the deepest bar on the southern coast. Should there prove
to be water enough for frigates, and should it be practicable to make th,e passage over the bar safe and easy, by the erection of light-h9uses on the shore,
and lights, or other distinct guides, on the bar, this harbor, situated within 60
miles of the city of Charleston, and 20 of Savannah river, intersecting the
interior water-communication between these cities, thereby securing the arrival of supplies of every kind, would possess a high degree of importance,
not only as a harbor of refuge, but also as a naval station.
The survey of the exte'rior shoals, constituting the bar, should be made
with the greatest care and all possible minuteness. Only when this shall
have been done, can the true relation of this inlet to the rest of the coast be
known; and on this relation the position and magnitude of the required defences will depend. For the preseat, the estitnate made so,me years ago by
the engtneer department is adopted, namely, $ 300,000.-(Statement 1, table E.)
Savannah, and mouth of Savannah river, Georgia.-Mention has been
made of the natural interior water-communication along the coast of South
Carolina. A similar communication extends, south-from the Savannah river,
as far as the St. John's, in Florida. Owing to these passages, the city of
Savannah, like Charleston, is liable to be approached by other avenues than
the harbor or river; and, accordingly, its defences must have relation to these
lesser, as well as greater channels.
The distance from the mouth of W as$aw sound, or even Ossabaw sound
{both to the southward of Savannah river), to the city, is not much greater
t~an from the mouth of the river; and an enterprise may proceed the whole
~tstance by water, or part of the way by water, and part by ]and, from either
mlet, or from both. As in the case of like channels in the neighborhood of
Charleston, it cannot now be detennined where they can be defended most
advantageously. It is hop<'d, however, that the localities will permit the
def nces to be placed near th_e inlets, because, thus placed, they wjll serve
the do 1bl ~mrp_ se _of g mrdmg th city of Savannah and covering these
harh r , wh1 h m time of war_, cai:not but be very useful.
.
The d fence of avannah nver 1s not difficult. A fort on Cock pur isl-
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and, lying just within the ~outh, and, verhaps, for additional security,
another on Tybee island, which forms the southern cape at the mouth of
the river, would prevent the passage pf vessels . up the channel, and cover
the anchorage between Tybee and Cockspur.
_
.
Old Fort Jackson, standing about four miles below the city, should be
maintained as a second barrier, both as respects the main channel and the
passages which come into the river from the south ; which last would not
be at all controlleq by works on Cockspur or 'I1ybee. Fort Pulaski, on
Cockspur island, is well advanced, and, to a certain extent, is even now efficient. $156,000 are required to complete the works, and the outworks. and
appendages. (Statement 1, table C.) To fortify Tybee island may require
$120,000. (Statement 1, table E.) And to repair Fort Jackson, $50,000.
(Statement 1, table A.)
.
Wassaib sound; Ossabaw sound; St. Catharine's sound, at the mouth
of Medway river ; Sapelo sound J Doby inlet ; Altalffl,aha sound, at the
mouth of Altamaha river; St. Simon's sound, at the nwuth ef Bujf"alo
creek; St. Andrew's sound, at the united mouths qf the Scilla and Santilla rivers; and Cumberland sound, at the mouth of the St. Mary's river.All these communications with the ocean are highly important, as regards
the line of interior navigation, and several of them as affording access to
excellent harbors. The last, and one or two others, are known to be· navigable to the largest sloops of war and,merchantmen, and so'l:ne of the others
are but little inferior as regards depth of entrance, or ·safety of anchorage .
.All these openings have yet to be surveyed. Some of them are probably
,e asily defensible by forts and batteries, while others may require the aid of
floating defences.
It is an important principle, bearing peculiarly on the defence of the whole
.s outhern coast, that, on a shore possessing few harbors, it is at the same time
more necessary to preserve them all for our own use, atid more easy to deprive an enemy of that shelter, without which a close blockade cannot be
maintained. This principle is enforced, in the instance of our southern coast,
by the two following weighty considerations, namely: 1st. Its remoteness
from the nearest naval rendezvous, the Chesapeake, which is, on a mean,
600 miles distant, and to leeward both as to wind and current; and 2d. Its
being close upon the larboard hand, as they enter the Atlantic, of the great
concourse of vessels passing at all seasons through the Florida ,c hannel.
,While, therefore, this part of the coast, from the concentration of vessels here,
is in great need of protection of some sort, naval aid can be extended to it
only with difficulty, and at the risk of being cut off from all retreat by a superior enemy.
Accurate and minute surveys, which will enable our vessels, whether purs ued by an enemy or suffering by stress of weather, to, shun the dangers which
beset the navigation of these harbors, and properly ananged defences to cover
.
.
them when arrived, seem to be indispensable.
·when _these harbors shall be fortified, tp.e operation of investing the coast,
and watching the great outlet of commerce through the Florida passage, will
be a difficult and hazardous ~e to an enemy, to whom no perseverance or
skill can avail to maintain a continuous blockade; while, on the part of our
small vessels of war, steam-frigates, and privateers, the same sort of supervision will be at all times easy and safe.
.
Nothing better can now be done than to assume $200,000 as the average
cost of defending each of the nine ent:r:,ances-giving a total of $1,800,000.
(Statement 1, tables E and F.)
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St. Augustine, Florida.-This, the most southern .of the harbors on the
Atlantic, and the key to the eastern portion of Florida, is accessible· to the
smaller class of merchantmen, to privateers, and to steam-vessels, and requires
;i certain amount of protection from attacks by water. _It i~, ·t~1erefore; proposed to put that part of the old Spanish fort (Fort Manon) that comlllands
the harbor in a serviceable state, which will require $50,000.-'-(Statemerit 1,
table A.)
· Having now passed along the whole Atlantic coast, from Passamaquoddy
to Cape Florida, pointed out every harbor of any consequence, and specified
every work that a thorough system of defence will require, we will, in ·?rder
to give a comprehensive view of the number and cost of the works, refer to
statement 1 accompanying this report. In that statement the works are divided into tables, showing separately, 1st (table A), the old works already repaired, and those proposed to be repaired and retained in tb.e system .of defence. 2d. (Table C.) Works under construction. 3d. (Table D.) Works
to be first commenced. 4th. (Table E.) Works to be commenced next after
those in table D. 5th.-(Table F.) Works to be last commenced.
Seacoast from Cape Florida to the mouth of the Sabine.
The first positions that present themselves on doubling around Cape Florida into the Gulf of Mexico, are Key West and the l)ry Tortugas.
·
A naval force, designed to control the navigation of' the gulf, could desire
no better position than Key West or the Tortugas. Upon the very wayside
of the only path through the gulf, it is, at the same time, well situated as to
all the great points therein. It overlooks Havana, Pensacola, Mobile, the
mouths of the Mississippi, and both the inlet and the outlet of the gulf. ·T he
~ Tortugas harbors, in particular, are said to afford perfect shelter for vessels of
every class, with the greatest facility of ingress and egress; and there can be
no doubt that an adversary in possession of large naval means would, with
great advantage, make these harbors his habitual resort, and his point of general rendezvous and concentration for all op©rations on this sea. With an
enemy thus posted, the navigation of the gulf by us would be imminently
hazardous, if not impossible; and nothing but absolute naval superiority would
avail anything against him. Mere military means could approach no nearer
than the near st shore of the continent.
It is believed that there are no harbors in the g·ulf at all comparable with
these that an enemy could resort to with his larger vessels. To deprive him
of these would, therefore, be interfering materially with any organized system of naval operations in this sea. The defence of these harbors would,
however, do much more than this. It would transfer to our own ..squadron,
even_ should it be inferior, these most valuable positions; and it would affor~
a pomt of refuge to our navy and our commerce, at the very spot where 1t
would be most nece... sary and useful.
By occupying two, or at most three small islands, the harbors of the Dry
Tortugas (there being an inner and an outer harbor) may be thoroughly protected. The work must be adequate to re!st escalade, bombardment, and
ca_nnonade fr m v e , and to s~tain a protracted investment; but as th~y
will no~ be xp. d to any or~rat10ns resembling a siege, there can be no difficulty m fulfillmg the cond1t10ns. They must have capacious store-rooms,
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!be thoroughiy bomb,pro?f, arid oe_q'eavily'armed. The fortification of Key
West should be of.a similar character.
,
. ;N~, details · c~n. be g.i ven m~til all thes~ positions have been minutely surveyed, with reference to ,defence.
..
,
., . .
,.. ~he, suin of .$3,000,000 was, some years ago, assumed by the Engmeer
Pepartment as necessary to provide defences for the Tortugas, and for Key ,
West; and this 'estimate may now be taken as a:mple. (Statement 2, table F.)
Turning now to tµe shore of the gulf, we find ~ porti?n, na1:nely, from
Cape Florida to Pensacola, that has never been e,xam.med with particular refer.e nce to the · defence of the harbors. Within this space there are Charlotte ·
J,,'~;;bor, Espiritu Santo bay, .Apa_laclticola bay, Appalaclte bay; St. Joseph's
,bµy, and Santa Rosa bay. Nothing better can now be done than to assum~
f9r the~e ,the estim~te formerly presented by !he Engineer Departtnent, yiz·:
.$1,000,000 for all.-(Statement 2, table F.) .
.
. .
-.
We now pass on to the remaining p~i_n1s, ?f defe?ce on the gi1lf. . _
Pensac_ola bay.~The \lpper arms of this considerable bay receive the
Yellow-water or Pea· river,· Middle river, and Escambia river. , ,·.rhe tributaries of the last, intedocking with the Alabama and the Chattahoochie, seem
(,o mark the' routes w:hereby, at some-future day.., canals will convey a part of
th,.e produ.cts of th~se rivers to Pensacol,a ; while the qualities and _position of
the harbor, and the favorable nature of the country, liave already marked out
lip.es of railroad co,m munication with a vast interim'. region.
.
, Santa Rosa sound extends ea_stward from _the lower part ~f Pensacola bay,
into Santa Rosa bay. On, the .west the lagoons · of Pensacola, Perdjdo, and
Mobile bays, respectively, interlock in such a man!ler as to require but a few
miles of cutting to complete a navigable channel frc:>m the :fast to the last
.,named ~ay, and th~nce, through an existing interior water communication,
:to the city of New Orleans.
.
·
.
_ J?,~n$acola bay has rare propertjes as a . harbor. It is now accessible to
frigates, and there is reason to hope tha_t the bar may be ·,permanent!y de~p,ened. The harbor is near -the coast, and the cq.anw~l aoross it straight arid
-easily hit. The ha1bor is perfectly land-lol~ked, and the. roadstead. very c~_
pa-·
::dous. ,. There are excellent po$itions· within,' for repairing, building; and
l~unching vessels, and for docks aI).d dock-:yards, iii healthy situations. The
~µppcy of good water is abundant. The· hG',rbor is perfectly defensible. TJ;iese
prqperties, in connexion with 'the position of the harbor-, as regards the coast,
have induced the Government to select it as a nav~l station and ·place of ren.· dezvous and repair.
, , ~
.
The defences of the water_passag~, as projecte~, are nearly complete. A
-work is just begun at the position of ~he Ba~ral)cas., It is indispe11sable, in
,connexion witn one or two other small worfrn, designed to cover the riav._yyard from a lateral attack through the we~tern bays: The Ban-ancas work
may require}$1 oo,oqo, ,and the otµers $20Q·,900, ~aking 'a total for ~en~acola of $300,000.~(Statement.2, table~ A an~. F.) .
·
.Per.dido bay.-,.I'his bay is intima,tely. re,lc!t.tep. to · 'Pensacola an_d )\fobile,,.
bays, both as regards security and intercommu~ication, . and should
carefully surveyed with a view (o these obj~cts. It must be fortified, and the·cost
inay be $200,000.-(Statement 2, table F~) '
.
.
.
M(}bile hay.-The plan of defence fo~ this bay compl;ises a fort, µ.ow need~ng some repairs, for Mobile point. Another fort is · p~ojected for Da~phin
island, and a tower for the defence of, Pass-au-If,eron. The estimates for ·all

be'

,:equire $905,000.-(Statement 2, tables E and F.)
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New Orleans and the delta of the Mississippi.-The most. northern water
communication between the Mississippi and the gulf, is by the passage called
the Rigolets, connecting Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. The next is
the pass of Chef Menteur, also ~onnecting these lakes. Through these passages, an enemy entering Lake Pontchartrain, would, at the same time that
he intercepted all water communicafon with Mobile and Pensacola, be able
t<t reach New Orleans from the southern shore of the lake; or he might continue onward through lake MaurepasJ Amite river, and Iberville river, thereby reachino- the Mississippi at the very head of the delta; or, l~nding within
the mouth~ of the Chef Menteur, he might move against the city along the
ridge of the Gentilly road. To the southwest of Chef Menteur, and at the
head of Lake Borgne, is Bayou Bienvenrue, a navigable channel (the one
followed by the English army in the last war), not running quite to the
Mississippi, but bounded by shores of such a nature as to enable troops to
march from the point of debarkation to the city.
·
These avenues are defended by Fort Pike at the Rigolets; by Fort Wood
at Chef Menteur; hy a small fort at Bayou Bienvenue; and by a tower at
Bayou Dupre.
·
The defences of the Mississippi are placed at the Plaquemine turn, about
seventy miles below New.., Orleans-the lowest position that can be occupied.
Fort Jackson is on the right bank, and Fort St. Philip a little lower down on
the left.
·
All these forts have Men abandoned for several years; and, until quite recently, having receiwed no attention in the way_of timely repairs, now require repairs somewhat extensive-especially Forts Jackson and St. Philip on
the Mississippi. Fifty thousand dollars will be required to place all these
works in order. (Statement 2, table A.)
The most western avenue by which New Orleans is approachable from the
sea, passes on the west side of the island of Grande Terre into Barrataria bay,
which is an excellent harbor for a float.mg force, guarding the coast trade on
that side of the Mississippi . . Prom this bay there are several passages leading
to New Orleans: '11he estimates for a work which is p.ow about to be begun
on Grande Terre island, is $280,000. (Statement 2, ·table 0.)
Several times in this report we have alluded to circumstances which would
demand the employment of floati~g defences, in addition to fixed defences
upon the shore. Vv e have here an instance in which that kind of defence
would be ve1y. useful. Fortifications will enable us to protect New Orleans
even from the most serious and determined efforts of an enemy; but, owing
to the great width of some of the exterior passages, we cannot, by fortification
alone, deprive an enemy of anchorages ( especially that of Ohandeleur island),
nor cover entirely the exterior water communication between the Rigolets and
Mobile. We must, therefore, either quietly submit to the annoyance an.d injury that an enemy in possession of these passages may inflict, or avert them
by a timely preparation of a .floating force adapted to their peculiar navigation,and capable, under die shelter of the forts, of being always on the alert, and
of assuming an offens·ve or defensive attitude, accordinoto the designs, con0
du.ct, or situation of the enemy.
The examination of the coast, from Cape Florida to the Sabine, having
now been completed, we will, as in the case of the Atlantic coast, refer, for
a comprehensive view of the number and cost of the works to statement 2,
wherein th.! works are divided into tables similar to those of 'statement 1.
T e works comprised in the last table (F) are generally such as may be

31

[2J

postponed to a late day. Bllt among them have been placed some (as, for
example, those for Tortug~s and Key_ West), as to which the examinati?n
has not been sufficiently mmute to decide to what clas~ they really appertam.

Western frontier> from tlte Sabine bay to Lake Superior.
The principles which should govern in _fortifyi°:g the _seaboard, are not
considered applicable to our _inland frontiers, which will very rarely be
found to call for regular forti'fications. Hence, in relation to that portion
of the frontier now under consideration, nothing more will be done than
t,o indicate the military positions or stations which it is believed should be
occupied by troops, in order to accomplish the object~ in view, and in
presenting estimates of the probabl~ cost of constructrng the necessary
barrilcks, quarters, and .storehouses, combined wjth such works of defence
as circumstances may appear to require, to ensure their protection against
the attacks to which they may be exposed.
The want of a personal knowledge of our extensive western frontier,
and the very limited surveys which have been made in that quarter, have
rendered somewhat embarrassing the· sele,ction of positions ; but it is· intended · merely to designate places, in a geographi~al sense, leaving the
particular sites on which the works should be erected, to be determined
hereafter by minute examiqations of the country at a~d around those positions ; whieh become the more important, inasmuch as the original locations of some of the places that wm be recommended to be retained, have·
been considered faulty.
The southern section of this frontier: extending from the Sabine bay to,
the Red ;river, borders ~11 the way on Texas; and has, it is believed, little
or nothing to apprehend · from Indian aggressions. 'I1he Camanches, the
only tribe of any po\Ver in that quarter, are repfesented as gradually receding to the westward, and the progress of the Texian settlements will tend
to push them further from our border. But o~r reiations with tht3 Texian
Republic, however amicable they may be at present, would seem to require
that some military force should _be stationed on or near -the boundary-line;
and it is, therefore, recommended to establish t,v:o small posts on the Sabine river, and to suppress Fort Jesup, which· js considered too far within
the frontier, or to retain it merely as a healthy cantonment.
As these would be posts of observation, having reference to national police more than to military defence, they ought to be established on the
river, where the principal roads cross it, by which we should be enabled to,
supervise the chief intercourse with our neighbors by land, and, at ·the:
same time, control the navigation of the Sabine_. The points where the
Opelousas and Natchitoches i:oads, leading to Texas, strike the river, are,.
therefore, recommended as the positions which should be occupied, and at
which barracks for two or three companies, defended by light-works, should
be constructed.
·
The middle section, which extends from the Red river to the 'Missouri,
is by far the most important portion of the whole of our western frontieL
It is along this line that the numerous tribes of Indians who have emigrated from the east have been located; thus adding to the indigenous
force already in that region an immense mass o(emigrants, some of whom
have been sent thither by coercion, with smothered feelings of hostilityrankling in their bosoms, which probably wait but for an occasion to burst
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forth in all its savage fury. These considerati~~s alone w:ould ~eem to call
for strong precautionary measures ; but an additional motive will be found
in our peculiar relations with those Indians.
We are bound by solemn treaty stipulations to interpose force, if necessary, to prevent dom8stic strife among. them, pr~serve peace betwe~n the
several tribes, and to protect them agamst any disturbances at their new
homes by the wild Indians who inhabit the country beyond. The Government has thus contracted the two-fold obligation of intervention among, and
protection of, the emigrant tribes, in addition to the duty which it o~es to
its own citizens, of providing for their safety.
.
.
This obligation, it is believed, can only be properly .fulfilled by maintainJ.
ing advanced positions in the Indian country, with an adequate restraining
military force; and that the duty of protecting our own citizens will be best
dischamed by establishing an interior line of posts alo_n g the western borders of the States of Arkansas and Missouri, as auxiliaries to the advanced
positions, and to restrain the intercourse between the whites and the Iqdians, and serve as rallying points for the neighboring militia in times of
alarm.
With these views, it is recommended to maintain Fort 'Towson, on Red
river, and Fort Gibson, on the Arkansas, a:p.d to establish a post at the.head
of navigation on the Kansas, and one at Table creek, on the Missouri, be. low the mouth of the Big Platte, as constituting the advanced positions Qn
this portion of the frontier.
For the secondary line, intended for the protection of the border settlements, it is recommended to adopt the positions which have been selected
by a commission of experienced officers along the western boundary of
Arkansas and Missouri (at some of which, it is understood, works are al.r eady in pro~ress), namely, Fort Smith, on the Arkansas, Fort Wayne, on
the Illinois, ~pring river, and Marais de Cygne; terminating, to tp.e north,
at Fort Leavenworth, on the Missouri. It is also recommended to establish
one or two intermediate posts between the ArkaIJ.sas and Red rivers, if, on
further examinati9n of the country, suitable positions can be selected near
• the State line. It is not deemed advisable to establish those posts on the
route of the road lately surveyed, which (especially the southern portion)
is considered too far in advance of the border settlements t9 accomplish theobject in view ; but if eligible positions cannot be found a!ong the line,
then a post on the road, where it crosses the Potean river, which is not very
remote from the settlements, might have a salutary influence.
On the northern portion of this frontier, extending from the Missouri river
to Lake Supcri_or, it _is recommended to establish a post near the upper forks
of the Des Momes nver; to maintain Fort Snelling, on the Mississippi; and
ultimately, to establish a post at the western extremity of Lake Superior.
The last is suggested with some qualification, for want of the necessary information by which to determine the channel of communication to that re~o~e J?<)Sitio~. ~het~er i_t shall be_ thr?ugh Lake Superior, or by the Miss1ss1pp1 and its tnbutanes, 1t would, m either case, be djfficult in peace, and
next to impra~ticable i_n time of war. As the position has, however, important geographical relations, and would enable us to extend our influence and
contr_ol over the Indian~ witl:in our territory, and afford protection to our tz:adcr~ m _that remote region, 1t would seem worthy of early occupation, if its
ma1 tenance can be rendered secure-a point which can only be dctem1ined
by a careful examination of the country.
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.It is nevertheless, recommended to retain Fort Crawford, at Prairie du
--Chien { Fort Winnebago, at the portage of the Fox and ·wisconsin rivers;
and Fort Howard ·at Green Bay. Tfu.ese posts are· deemed r;i.ecessary to protect that portion of our frontier, while, at the same time, they serv~ to cover
an important line of intercommunication between the northern lakes and
the wes~erri waters.
.
It has not been thought expedient to continue the interior line of defence
across from the Missouri to the Mississippi river. Our Indian relations in that
quarter assume a different aspect. There is no special guarantee of perpetual
occupation of that country by the tribes \Vho now inhabit it; nor can it be
doubted that they will ultimately be pushed, by the advance of our population, to tfi.e west of the Missouri river. Under these circumstances, it is_believed that the intermediate post recommended to be established on the Des
Moines river, co-operating with the posts on the Missouri, and those on the
Upper Mississippi, will afford adequate- protection to the border settlements·
against any attacks to which they are likely to be exposed.
It may not be atiuss to observe, that the positions which have been designated for the western frontier, will not, of themselves, have the desired influence in restraining the Indian tribes and protecting our border settlements,
without the aid of a respectable force, of which a full proportion should be
mounted, and held disposable at all times, for active service in the field. To
effect this, the works should be so constructed that while they will afford adequate accommodations for all the troops when they are not actively em~
ployed, their defence may safely be intrusted to a small force. With these
precautionary measures, and the co-operation of small but effective reserves,
posted within sustaining distances of the several sections of the frontier, it is
believed that peace may be preserved, and the first onset of war met, until
the militia of the neighboring country could be imbodied and brought into
the field.
It only remains to recapitulate the positions which have been recommended to be occupied; apportion the requisite force, and present a con..
jectural' estimate of the cost of erecting the accommodations and defences
deemed necessary at each.
1. For quarters for 100 men at the post on·the Sabine where
the Opelousas road crosses that river, including defences $20,000 00
2. For quarters for 100 men at the post on the Sabine where
the Natchitoches road crosses, including defences
20,0001·oo
3. For permanent quarters, and other accommodations, for
500 men at Fort Towson, including defences
100,©00- 00
4. For permanent quarters, and other accommodations, for
1,000 men at Fort Gibson, including defences - 180,000 00
5. For quarters for 300 men at the post on the Kansas, in60,000 -00
cluding defences
6. For quarters, and other· accommodations, 'for 500 men at ·
the post at ,.fable creek, near the mouth· of the Platte,· ',
on the Missouri, including defences
-· , .75,000 ·oo
7. For quarters, and other accommodations, for 400' men at
~
the post on the Des Moines river, including defences - . , 60,000, 00
8. For the enlargement and repair of Fort 'Snelling, 1to fit it '
·(
for the accommodation of 300 men, including defences
30,000 00
9. For quarters for 400 men at the post at the western ex50,000 00
tremity of Lake Superior, including defences
3
1

•
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'10. For quarters for 200 men at the post between the Red

and Arkansas rivers, including defences
11. For completing quarters, and other accommodations, for
200 men at Fort Smith, including defences
12. For completing quarters, and other accommodations, for
200 men at Fort Wayne, including defences 13. For quarters, and other accommodations, for 200 men at
the post at Spring river, including defences
14. For quarters, and other accommodations, for 200 men at
the post at Marais de Cygne, including defences.
.15. For completing quarters, and other accommodat10ns m
progress, for 400 men at Fort Leavenworth, including
defences
Total for western frontier

$50,000 001
50,000 00·
59,000 OO-,
50,000 00 ·
50,000 00·
50,000 00
895,000 00

It is deemed proper here to observe, that great exactness or precision has.
not been attempted in preparing the estihiates submitted in the foregoing report. Hence, the amounts stated for the various objects are to be rngarded·
only as approximations. They could not be anything more, on the data
used, which, for want of minute surveys and reconnoissances, were necessarily vague. It is believed, however, that the results presented will be found
sufficiently accurate for the general purposes contemplated by the resolutions
11nder which this report has been prepared.
The time required to construct and put in order the whole system of defence upon the several lines of our frontier, must depend on the amount of
the annual appropriation. All that need now be said on the subject is, that
in an undertaking necessarily involving so much time, and of such vital importance, there should be no relaxation of -diligence. With all diligence,,
many years must necessarily be consumed. But the work may be too much.
hurried, as well as too much delayed. There is a rate of progress at which
jt will be executed in the best manner, and at the minimum cost. If more
hurried, it will be defective in quality, and more costly if delayed.
The maximum amount that can be beneficially expended annually upon
the construction of fortifications, will depend upon ·the strength of the corps
<>f engineers, upon the sums annually appropriated, upon the periods of
the sessions at which the appropriations are made, and upon the proper
distribution of the sums appropriated among the several works under con.struction.
If the necessary amounts are appropriated, at or near the commencement
<>f each regular session of Congress, and the whole amount distributed along·
the coast, so as not to assign too large a sum to any single work, it is believed
that, with the present strength of the corps of engineers, the sum of four and
A half millions of dollars, at least, may be annually expended, until the system adopted for the defence of our frontier shall have been so far advanced,
ae to render it proper to curtail the operations.
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There are available for operations, six field officers of the c01ps of engineers, who may each superintend operations and disbursements to the
amount of $300,000
$1,800,000
12 captains, each $150,000 1,soo,O0O
12 first lieutenants, each $75,000
900,000

4,500,000
leaving 24 2d lieutenants and brevet 2d lieutenants, as assistant engineers.
The past experience of the department justifies the belief, that, with the
present strength of the corps of engineers, this sum may be annually expended on a system of operations conducted in a prudent and beneficial manner. Upon the occurrence of any sudden emergency, however, an additional
force might be temporarily called to the aid of the corps, and a much larger
sum might be expended.
·
All which is respectfully submitted.
JOS. G. TOTTEN,
Colonel and Chief Engineer.
Hon. JOHN BELL,
Secretary ef War.
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STATEMENT 1,
Of the f orti.ftcations constructed, constructing, or repairing, and of th~s~
proposed to be constructed or repaired for the defence of the seacoast ,
from Passama,quoddy bay to Cape Florida.

Designation of the works.

Required to complete. ·

A.-Old works repaired, and those proposed to be repaired, with the amounts required to put them in a
serviceable condition.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
IO
11

12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21

Fort at Gloucester, Mass.
Fort Lee, Mass.
Fort Sewall, Marblehead, Mass.
Fort Independence, Boston, Mass.
Fort Winthrop, Governor's Island, Boston, Mass.
West-head battery, Governor's island, Boston, Mass.
Southeast battery, Governor's island, Boston, Mass.
Fort Wolcott, Newport, R. I.
Fort Green, Newport, R. I. Fort Hale, New Haven, Conn.
Fort Gibson, Eilis's island, N Y.
Fort Wood, Bedlow's island, N. Y. Fort Richmond, Staten island, N. Y. }
Fort Tompkins, Staten island, N. Y. Battery Hudson, Staten island, N. Y.
Battery Morton, Staten island, N. Y. Fort Johnston, Cape Fear river, N. C.
Fort Washington, Potomac river, Md.
Fort Macon, Beaufort, N. C. Fort Jackson, Savannah river, Georgia
Fort Marion, St. Augustine, Florida -

C.- Works under construction.
Fort Warren, George's island, Boston, Mass. 1
2
Fort Adams, Newport, R. I. 3
Fort Trumbull, New London, Conn.
4
Fort Schuyler, Throg's Neck, N. Y. 5
Fort Delaware, Delaware river
6
Fort Monroe, Old Point Comfort, Va.
7
Fort Calhoun, Hampton roads, Va. B Fort Caswell, Oak ·sland, N. C.
~
9
Fort umter, Charleston, S. C.
IO Fort Pulaski, Cockspur island, Georgia

$10,0D0
2,000
10,000
95,000
100,000

5,000
5,000
10,000
2,000

5,000
5,000
150,000
450,000

5,000
35,000
10,000

50,000
50,000
999,000
$275,000
45,000
203,000

180,000
491,000
138,367
356,000

6,000
201,000
156,000
2,051,367
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Required tq complete.

Designation of the .works.

~

JO

-!--------------------D.-·Works to be first commenced.

1

. Fort at Bucksport, Penoli>scot river, Me.

2
3.
4
5
6

Forf at ohe mouth of Kennebec river, Me.
Fort Scammel, House island, Portland, Me. Works in Port$mouth harbor, N. H. Fort Pic,kering, Salem, Mass.
Fort on Jack's point, Marblehead, Mass.
Works at Provincetown, Cape Cod, J_\iass.
Works at New Bedford, Mass.
.
Fort on Rose island, Narraganset roads, R. I.
Fort on Soller's pciint flats, Md.
Fort on ;I'homas's point, Patuxent river, Md.

7
8
9

10
11

$15@,000
,30(l),ij00
.48,000
30(),000
174,000
144,000
600,000
300,000
150,000
1,000,000
250,000
3,416,000

E.- Works to be commenced ne:ct after tltose in D.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Fort Preble, Portland harbor, Me.
Works at Gloucester, Mass.
Closing Broad Sound pass, Boston harbor, Mass.
Works at Gurnet point, Plymouth, Mass.
Works at Stonington point, Conn.
Fort on Cedar point, Potomac river, Md.
Works at Georgetown harbor, S. C.
Works in Port Royal roads, .S. C.
Works on Tibee island, Savannah river, Ga. -

s

$155,000
200,000
210,000
100,000
200,000
300,000
250,000
300,000
120,000
1,835,000

F.- Works to be last commenced.

1
.2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Works in Eastpost harbor, Me.
Works in Machias harbor, Me.
Works in Mount Desert island, Me.
Works at Castine, Me.
·works at St. George's bay, Me.
Works at Damariscotta bay, Me.
Works at Broad bay, Me.
Works at Sheepscot bay, Me.
.Works on Hog island channel, Portland, Me.
Works at the mouth of Saco river, Me.
Works at the mouth of Kennebunk river, Me.
Works at York, Me. -

$1.00,000
100,000
500,000
, 50,000

}
,;.

}

l3~,QOO
75,000
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STATEMENT I-Continued.

Required to com•
plete.

Designation of the works.

13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Works at Newburyport, Mass.
Works at Beverly, Mass.
Works at Naug·us Head, Mass.
Works at Fort Sewall, Marblehead, Mass.
Fort and outworks at Nantasket Head, Boston, Mass.}
Redoubt on Hog island, Boston harbor, Mass.
Works at Tarpaulin cove, Mass.
7
Works at Holmes's hole, Mass.
J
Works at Edgartown, Mass. ~
Works at Falmouth, Mass.
·works at Hyannis harbor, Mass.
Works at Nantucket harbor, Mass.
Works at Canonicut island, R. I.
Closing west passage of N anaganset roads, R. I.
Fort Griswold, New London, Ct.,
·worlrn at the mouth of Connecticut river, Ct.
Fort Hale, New Haven harbor, Ct.
Fort Worster, New Haven harbor, Ct.
Works for harbors and towns between New Haven and
New York Work in Gardiner's bay, Long Island sound, N. Y. Works in Sag harbor, N. Y. Fort on Wilkins's point, Long island, N. Y. Fort on Middle-ground shoal, Sandy Hook, N. Y.
Fort on East Bank shore, Sandy Hook, N. Y.
Fort at Delaware breakwater Fort opposite Fort Delaware, Del.
Fort on Elk river, Maryland Fort on Hawkins's point, Maryland Works at Annapolis harbor, Maryland
Fort on Point Patience, Patuxent river, Maryland
Works at St. Mary's, Potomac river, Maryland
Works at Bald Head, Cape Fear river, N. C.
Works at Federal point, Cape Fear river, N. C.
Works at the mouth of Santee river, S. C. }
Work:; at Bull's bay, and other inlets, S. C. Works at Stone sound, S. C.
Works at orth Edisto sound, S. C. Works at outh Edisto sound, S. C. Works at St. Helena sound, S. C.

j

$100,000
50,000
51,000
174,000
1,020,000

250,000

1,200,000
307,000
198,000
100,000
48,000
42,000
200,000
400,000
100,000
686,000
1,681,412
1,681,412
600,000
521,000
50,000
376,000
250,000
246,000
300,000
180,000
18,000
100,000
50,000
50,000
50,000
150,000
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STATEMENT 1-Continued.
s:l
0
~
~

Required to com..:
plete.

Designation of the works.

~
~

0

.52
,53
54

Works at W assaw sound, Georgia
Works at Ossabaw sound, Georgia
Works at St. Catharine's sound, Georgia
Works,at Sapelo sound, Georgia
Works at Doby inlet, Georgia
Works at Altamaha sound, Georgia Works at St. Simon's sound, Georgia
·works at St. Andrew's sound, ·Georgia
Cumberland sound, mouth of St. Mary's river, Ga.

55
56
57
58
59

oO

>

$1,800,000

14,389,824

~

Recapitulation.
A.
C.
D.
E.

Old forts and batteries
Fortifications under construction Fortifications to be first commenced
Fortifications to be next constructed

-

-

$999,000
2,051,367
3,416,000
1,835,000

F. Fortifications to be last commenced

-

-

8,301,367
14,389,824

-

-

22,691,191
ENGINEER DEPARTMENT'

Washington, July I_, 1841.

I

-

I2J
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STATEMENT 2,

~ Of the fortifications constructed, co_nstructing, or repairing, and of /hosf:I'
, proposed to be constructed or repaired, for the defence
tier, from Cape Florida to the Sabine bay.

o/ the gulf f ron-

,=
0

~
~

~

Required to complete.

Designation of the works.

~

-

6

A.-Old works repaired, and those proposed to be repaired, 1 and the amounts required to put them in a
serviceable condition.
1 Fort Barrancas, Pensacola, Florida 2 . Fort St. Philips, Mississippi river, La.
3 E01t Pike, Rigolets, La.
-.
4 · Fort ·wood, Chef Menteur, La.
5 Battery Bienvenue, La.
6 Tower at Bayou Dupre, La.
7 Fort Jackson, Mississippi river, La. - -

-

'

I

$100,000··

-

-

l

~
j

-

-

.
5p,ooo-

15p,ooo

- C.- Works under construction.
Fort Livingston, Barrataria island, La.

-

-

$280,000

E.- W9rks to be constructed after those in D, of statement 1, are completed.

1

Tower at Pass au Heron, Mobile bay, Alabama

-

$25,000

-

$3,000,000

F . - Works to be last commenced.

1

2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10

Works at Key West, or Tortugas, Florida
Works at Charlotte harbor, Florida Works at Esperitu Santo bay, Florida
Works at Appalachicola bay, Florida
Works at Appalachee bay, Florida Works at St. Joseph's bay, Florida Works at Santa Rosa bay, Florida
Works to cover navy-yard at Pensacola
Works at Perdido bay, Alabama
Fort at Dauphin i land Mobile bay, Alabama

1
j
I

-

1,000,000

200,000
200,000
880,000
5,280,000

j[ ;~ J

·41
STATEMEiNT 2-P,ontinued~

Recapitulation.

.A. Old forts and batte;ries
C; Fortificaii~ns u~der construction E. Works io be const~cted after those in D, 0£ ~tate, ment 1, are completed -

- $1-50,000
r,280,000,
. ~5,000

)

.4q5,QOO
5,2$0,000·

F. Works to .·be last. COJ!lmenced

5,735,000
'

Report from , the Ordnance 'Department,, in; answer to a resolution
Senate relative to the defences of the country.

of the

OR,DNANCE OFFICE,

' Washington, June 21, 1841.
Sm: On the subject of the Senate's resolution of the 3d of March last, relative to the defence of the yountry, which was referred ,by you tq this office,
I have the honor , to report: A resolution of the same tenor, .and (with tp.e
exception of the 7th paragraph) in the same words, was adopted by the Senate on the 2d of March, 1839. The subject was referred to 4 board of officers, whose report is printed in the Senate doc. No. 451 of the 1st session,
26th Congress. To that repo1t I beg .leave to. _refer for. an answer to such
parts of the present resolution as relate to this department, and from it the
following condensed statement is extracted :
,
4

...

.}

,._,

Statement of the amount of ordnance, ordnance stores, '5'"c., on hand and required.

l':)

.

1-.J

Heavy
Field
cannon. cannon.

Seacoast from Passamaquoddy to Cape Florida.

Heavy
carriages.

Field
Shot and Powder (lbs). Cost of stores to
be provided.
shells.
carriages.

~

.

Old forts and batteries, table A

-

-

{Required
.On hand

-

-

-

Fortifications to be first commenced, table D

Fortifications to be next constructed, table E

.

-

-

'

~ortifications to be last constructed, table F

-

1,040
681

57
57

109,700
98,755

878,800
878,800

-

-

359

-

10,945

190

14
14

322
153

14
14

33,600
24,848

205,800
60,170

132

-

169

-

8,752

145,630

33
33

2,254
257

33
33

228,700
122,000

1,616,300

-

1,997

-

106,700

1,616,300

23
23

1,249

-

23
23

127,700
22,320

874,300

511

-

1,249

-

105,480 ..

874,300

-

717
24

39
39

-

717

39
39

75,600
7,954

471,300

To be provided

683

-

717

-

67,646

471,300

86

139
139

4,651

139
139

479,000
33,400

3,388,750

4,565

-·

4,651

-

445,600

3,388,750

{Required
·On hand
To be provided

Fortifications under construction, table C -

57
57

146

To be provided

New f'orti.fications completed, table B

1,040
894

-

- -322---

-

. 2,254
1,309

l To be provided

945

!Required
On hand

!Required
On hand

-

l To be provided
{Required
On hand

{Required
·:.
On hand
To be provided

--1,249
738

---

-4,651
--

-

$210,937 6

134,095 C0

-

1,465,435 ( 0

-

889,111 I 0

-

652,919 · 0

-

4,573,828

0

t

Gulf of Mexico, from Cape Florida to the Sabine.

Old forts and batteries, table A

-

New fortifications completed, table B

'

-

-

. '

-

Works to be constructed after those in table D, statement I, are completed, table E -

Works to be last commenced, table F

-

66
45

-l To be provided

21

-

-

Western frow;ier, from the Sabine to Lake Superior

3
3

6,900
6,000

-

29

-

900

520
306

12
12

520
228

12

12

53,200
37,600

327,450
95,735

To be provided

214

-

292

-

15,600

231,715

-

175
124

175
13

6
6

18,100
9,815

122,400

lTo be provided

51

162

122,400

-

12
2

lTo be provided

10

-

8,285

[Required
On hand

i

Required
On hand

J

3
3

6
6

-

-

12
12

1,200
400
800

-

14,606 00

228,307 00

-

110,179 00

6,700

-

6,700

9,108 00

-

-

903
21

25
25

903

25
25

92,800 .
10,400

579,850

lTo be provided

882

-

903

-

82,400

579,850

809,559 00
44,097 00

Required
On hand

-

Northern frontier, from Lake Superior to Passamaquoddy
Total to be provided

88,950
38,950

66
37

· { Required
On hand

-

Fortifications under construction, table C -

.
-

{Required
On hand

-

-.:;

-

-

~
~

-

12

139

12

139

15,100

25,250

375

180

375

180

55,500

197,600

342,322 00

8,547

319

10,927

319

923,708

7,659,795

9,484,504 60

,-,
~
a....J
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In reply to the. 7th paragraph of tb,e resolution, I beg leave to. pr~sent a
copy of a report made to the Secretary of War in Febr4ary last, showm.g
greatest amount' of funds which could be beneficially expended ~nually 1n
this department in preparations for the national defence. W ork1!1g at the
rate there stated, it would require_!;lbOQt twenty-five years kt pmv1d_~_all the·
armament for the for,ti&cat~ons embrµce<;l in the projected sy~tem of 1d~fence;
but it is to be remarked that mor~ than qne halj of that quantity ~o ht; provided, is fo1 the fortifipations on the seaboard embraced in table F, qesignated
as those to be last constmcted, and which would probably be built at a very
distant day.
.
Very respectf-qlly, your opedie:nt seryant,

t1?-e

G. BOMFORD,
Colonel of Or<fnance.
Hon.

JOHN BELL,

Secretary of1War.

ORDNANCE OFFICE,

Washington, February 19, 1841.
Sm: Herewith I have the honor to submit a brief statement of) the_ordnance and ordnanqe stores, that may be readily provided .d~ri~g the, present
year, together with an estimate of the cost of. the same, amounting, in round
numbers, to one million of dollars; should it be required, a statement in detail will be promptly prepared.
I~ is pr?per to state _t)lat the operative means of this departi;nent, in con nex10n with the pubhc arsenals and the private foundries and workshops,
ar~ f'":ly adequate to prepare during the present year, advantageously, &nd at
fair pnces, at least one half of the ordnance and ordnance stores enumerated
~n the accompanying statement. These means can also be much extended
m the course of the year, should the public service demand it.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Hon. J. R.

G. BOMFORD,
Colonel of Ordnance.
POINSETT,

Secretary of War.

Estimate of the probable amount of funds tltat can be advantageously expended, per annum, by the Ordnance Department, for procuring cannon, carriages, cannon-shot, artillery, and other equipments, tc., o/C,
For 600 heavy cannon, including 10 and 8 inch heavy
howitzers, averaged at $450 each
" 300 heavy gun carriages and equipments, at $400 each " 150 bronze field guns, averaged at $400 each 120 "
" 100 iron
"
"
"
" 250 field gun carriages and equipments, averaged at
300 each

$270,000
120,000
60,000
12,000

75,000

45
For cannou, shot, shells, &c., the supply 0f which may be
increased to quadruple the amount
" 2,000 sets of accoutrements for infantry and rifle, at $3 84
each
" 500 sets of artillery harness, complete, at $80 50 each " 20,000 sets of cavalry equipments, complete, at $12 each-,
" 2,000 sets of horse
"
"
"
32 "
" timber for 1,000 gun carriages, at $30 each
" iron for 1,000 "
"
60 "
"' saltpetre, $25,000, sulphur, $5,000, and gunpowder,
37,950

[ 2]
$100,000
76,800
40,250
24,000
64,000
30,000
60,000
67,950

$1,000,000

